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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Problem
The upsurge in Soviet military capabilities in the last
decade or so has caused increased concern that the United States
must not only balanca Soviet military power in fact but must
also be perceived as doing so both by the Soviets themselves and
alsd by third-country observers. There are a number of ways
available for structuring inquiry into po.nceptioais and related
questions, and this study illustrates one of them. The con-
clusions to be presented are the product of coding twenty years
(1955-1974) of selected articles and "Chronicle" items from a
highly respected French journal: Defense Nationale.
Methodology
Defense Nationale appeared 219 times from 1955 through 1974,
and the writer looked at each issue except a missing 1964 number.
Individual journals were read selectively in line with criteria
which aimed at "bringing to the surface" articles or "Chronicle"
items which contained comparisons of US-Soviet and East-West
military capabilities. While the main concern of this study is
with US-USSR balances, East-West conventional military power
* balances were also coded so as to obtain some understanding of
the context within which these balances were most often viewed,
i.e., whether in a US-Soviet or East-West context. In all, 258
*articles and 77 "Chronicle" items were sources for the data
presented in this report.
Codin, Defense Nationale meant answering as many of the
following questions as possible relative to the military capa-
bilities being compared therein:
(1) What military capabilities are being compared?
(2) Whose capabilities (i.e., US-USSR or Western-Soviet
bloc)are being compared?
(0) t1hich side does the DN author see as superior at
the time of writing?
(4) Does the DN au,:hor qualify his conclusion by
bringing o-ut nontrasting information?
(5) What justifications does the author provide for his
conclusions?
(6) What sources does the author indicate provided him
information about the balance or the capabilities
being compared?
(7) What events does he acknowledge as triggering his
thinking about the balance?
(8) What recommendations does he make in view of the
state of the balance as he perceives it?
Questions 5 through 8 applied to US-USSR comparisons only.
Conclusions
The first group of conclusions relates to tle frequency of
comparisons:
(1) Comparisons of the strategic nuclear balance
occurred most frequently by far.
(2) Of the US-Soviet conventional balances, the naval
balance elicited the largest number of comparisons.
In contrast, the US-Soviet conventional or ground
forces balance and the air balance were the least
frequently compared of all US-Soviet balances.
(3) There were no large-scale increases or decreases
in the attention paid to any of the balances - as
measured by frequency of comparisons - when one
contrasts the number of comparisons for each
balance in 1965-1969 with those for 1970-1974.
(4) There was a strong trend over the twenty years to
view the naval balance in US-Soviet terms and the
conventional or ground forces balance in East-West
terms. (Air balance comparisons were too few to
allow for conclusions in this regard.)
The next group of conclusions concerns Defense Nationale
perceptions about the state of each balance:
(1) Over the twenty years, the US was perceived as
superior in strategic nuclear bombs and warheads,
ballistic-missile submarines, strategic bombers/
strategic aviation, SLBMs, and naval nower-in-
general. Recent trends indicate no significant
change in Perceptions for the first three,
increased perceptions of US superiority for the
fourth, and increased perceptions of equality
coupled with decreased perceptions of US
superiority for the fifth. (While the US was
also perceived as superior in the general air
balance, number totals seemed too small to be
statistically significant.)
(2) There were two USSR dominated balances over the
twenty years: strategic missiles-in-general/ICBMs
and the conventional or ground forces. Recent
trends indicate increased perceptions of Soviet
superiority with a decrease in perceptions of US
superiority in the formner and no significant change
in the latter.
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(3) The overall strategic nuclear balance was over-
whelmingly seen as in equality over the twenty
years with recent trends reflecting increased
perceptions cf equality at the expense of perceptions
of US superiority.
(4) When one aggregates all strategic missile comparisons
for the twenty years, one finds an almost equal
number of comparisons favoring one or the other
superpower. Recent trends, however, favor the Soviets
with the US experiencing an accompanying decrease in
superiority perceptions. As already mentioned, the
USSR was viewed as ahead in strategic missiles-in-
general and ICBMs while the US was viewed as ahead in
SLBMs.
(5) Perceptions of Soviet superiority over the twenty
years in the US-Soviet conventional or ground forces
balance were matched by perceptions of Soviet bloc
superiority in the East-West balance. Similazly,
perceptions of US superiority in the US-Soviet Naval
balance were matched by perceptions of Western
superiority in the East-West balance. Recent trends,
furthermore, reflect continued perceptions of both
Soviet Union and Soviet bloc superiority in conven-
tional or ground capabilities. In contrast, while
recent trends show continued perceptions of Western
superiority in the East-West naval balance, they do
not show continued perceptions of U.S. superiority
in the US-Soviet balance, where perceptions are
trending toward equality.
Justifications presented by Defense Nationale authors for their
perceptions were too varied, multi-faceted, and tied to individual
balance areas to allow for general conclusions here.
There are four general conclusions about the sources of
information acknowledged by the Defense Nationale authors:
(1) Most frequently acknowledged were sources associated
with the U.S. Government's executive or legislative
branches (particularly the former).
(2) Non-governmental annuals devoted to military/naval
affairs (e.g., IISS's Military Balance, Flottes de
Combat) were the second most acknowledged sources.
(3) French Government sources were mentioned in surpris-
ingly few instances.
(4) References to books or periodicals were infrequent
but not as rare as references to newspapers.
As with justifications, triggering events acknowledged by
D6fense Nationale .uthors were too varied and multi-faceted to allow
for generalxzatxon3 here.
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Of Defense Nationale recommendations which had some general
applicability by being made in connection with more than one
balance area, three recurred most frequently and another three
recurred less often than one might have expected:
(1) In connection with strategic balance comparisons, nany
Defense Nationale authors encouraged French or
Western European development of a force de frappe
and/or related delivery systems. This recommen-
dation was usually made in connection with equality
references but also occurred with a small number of
both "pro-U.S." and "pro-S.U." comparisons. It
was not unusual for this recommendation to be
associated (in instances of perceived equality or
Soviet superiority) with the thought that the U.S.
could no longer, due to increases in Soviet
strategic power, be counted on to go to nuclear war
in response to Soviet aggression in Europe. It was
also not unusual, regardiess of the perceived state
of a balance, to have this suggestion justified by
claims that France must develop her deterrent either
to avoid a superpower condominium or to assure
herself a strong voice in NATO circles.
(2) Recurring almost as frequently were admonitions that
the U.S. and/or the West should increase their
flexible response capabilities. These recommenda-
tions occurred especially with strategic comparisons
that had both sides equal. They also arose with
"pro-S.U." conventional or ground forces comparisons
(3 times) and "pro-U.S." naval comparisons (once,
possibly twice).
(3) Third in frequency - and occurring in almost all
cases in connection with strategic balances - were
suggestions to the effect that the West Aust act to
counter Soviet politico-psychological advances in
the Third World. These were made most often in the
late fifties and early sixties when Khrushchev was
strongly wooing the underdeveloped and verbally
supportiiig "wars of national liberation." They
were particularly associated with the Soviet's
reaching equality in the strategic areas (hence
assuring themselves a modicum of security vis-a-vis
the U.S.) or with Soviet space activities viewed as
particularly impressive to Third World states.
(4) Other than with the strategic nuclear balance, there
were no recommendations that supported arms controls
measures (even with MBFR).
(5) Surprisingly,on only one occasion did an author call
upon France, exclusive of the West or the U.S., to
build up her conventional force capabilities (in this
case, naval).
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(6) As already noted, while many Defense Nationale
authors desired that France/Western Europe
build a nuclear deterrent due to some lack of
confidence in the U.S., there were--again,
surprisingly--no recommendations to the effect
that, since one or another balance was shifting
in favor of the U.S.S.R., France/Western Europe
should move to build up political fences with
the Soviets. Indeed, recommendations that the
U.S. or Western countries as a group increase
their flexible response capabilities signified
willingness to continue working within the
American/Western alliance context.
Implications for future research:
(1) Other perception studies should be undertaken focus-
ing on different countries and guided by similar
questions as asked herein. These should complement
one another, and they should provide the basis for
making applicable generalizations about perceptions.
Based on these generalizations, policy-makers might
then be better able to take into account the reaction
of other countries to U.S.-S.U. military balance
developments.
(2) Some future studies should deal with sources similar
to Defense Nationale but others should focus on
different sources to ascertain the relative utility
of each.
,(3) Some future studies should definitely involve experi-
mentation with machine-reading of foreign materials.
There should also be experimentation with computer-
coding, --tabulation, and -correlation of data whether
or not it is machine-read.
(4) Unless materials are to be machine-read, I recommend
that any one future investigator restrict his focus to
a smaller number of balance areas than I di.. "Jumping"
from one balance area to another was more disruptive
to my thought processes than I would have predicted.
Also, the sheer volume of reading, coding, tabulation,
and problem-solving can be handled much more effi-
ciently the narrower one's focus.
(51 It may be that the focus on comparisons pj se is too
narrow. Consideration scould be given to coding not
only balance comparisons but also, on a thematic basis,
everything said about U.S. or Soviet endeavors in a
particular area of military concern.
(6) A particularly important problem requiring attention
is how to make the coding process as replicable as
possible without having to adopt a morass of coding
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rules or z-ules which force one to leave out
relevant materials. it would be particularly
gocd in future studies to have a least two
investigators work together reading the same
materials independently and consulting on ambiguous
cases. It also would be interesting to have some-
one attempt to duplicate what I have done to see
to what extent their coding replicates mine.
(7) If time had allowed, I could have done a good deal
more with my data, particularly as regards
providing explanations, making correlations,
pointing out policy implications, and tying in the
"sub-balance" data.contained in the appendixes with
the balance-in-general data presented in the body
of the study. I strongly believe efforts should be
made in those directions, and I would be ple;.sed to
cooperate with any investigators willing or assigned
to perform such tasks.
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SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
Introduction
The upsurge in Soviet military capabilities in the last
decade or so has caused increased concern that the United States
must not only balance Soviet military power but must also be
perceived as doing so. A recent Secretary of Defense, e.g., in
writing about the strategic nuclear balance, called upon the
United States to:
...maintain capabilities such that everyone--friend,
foe, and domestic audience alike--will perceive that
we are the equal of our strongest competitors. We
should not take the chance that, in this most hzardous
of areas, misperceptions could lead to miscalculation,
confrontation, and crisis.
He reiterated the same theme again when writing about the naval
balance:
... the naval forces of the Soviet Union and its allies
are not generally superior to those of the United
States and its allies, and.. .this should be perceived
by well-informed observers.*
There are a number of ways available for structuring inquiry
into perceptions and related questions,** and this paper illustrates
one of them. It is the product of coding twenty years (1955
through 1974) of selected articles and "Chronicle" items from
the Trench journal Ddfense Nationale.
D~fense Nationale
According to its masthead, D4fense Nationale (referred to
herein as DN) inquires into the "great national and international
* Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Depart-
ment Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T, pp. 1-14 and 1-21.
**See Appendix I for a review of some of the ways of approaching
the perceptions problem.
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questions", be they "military, economic, political, [or] scientific."
It was originally published under the longer title: Revue De
Defense Nationale. Those familiar with French periodicals dealing
with foreign or defense affairs view it as a highly respected
journal. It is published by the Comitg d'etudes de defense nationale,
an organization akin to the U.S.'s Council on Foreign Relations.
Comitg membership reflects France's military, governmental,
and industria., elite. From a poll taken in 1970, DN editozs
estimated thmt active duty military personnel accounted at that time
for approximately one-half the regular readership.
Except for specifying military or governmental titles when ap-
propriate, it was usual DN practice to identify authors by name
only. Hence, it is not possible to generalize about their profes-
sions, other than that they often consisted of governmental and
military officials, including ministers and military chiefs-of-staff.
The journal appeared 11 times a year, and a total of 219 were
published from 1955 through 1974. In 1968 one normally expected
issue failed publication, but the editors made up for it by in-
creasing the content of several published companion issues.
The only year for which statistical totals (to be presented below)
are not fully comparable with those of other years is 1964. The
reason is that the July number was missing from the serial col-
lection to which the writer had access.
Each journal numbered approximately 175 pages and contained
about 10 articles and 25 to 30 "Chronicle" items (referred to
herein as "c.i.'s"). Articles accounted for approximately two-thirds
of any one journal. As suggested by the masthead, they did not
necessarily deal with military or defense questions but also with a
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wide variety of other topics such as syndicalism, the UAR after
Nasser, meteorological satellites, or the relation between salaries,
prices and unemployment. Items found in the "Chronique" section took
up about one-fourth of each journal. Their purpose was to keep
readers informed of current developments in national and inter-
national military, naval, maritime, and aeronautical affairs
as well as NATO, international organization, and French overseas
matters. Most were moderate in length though some were no longer
than one paragraph while others were equivalent to or approached
full-length articles. The remainer of each DN issue was devoted to
advertisements and a section entitled "Bibliography", which briefly
described recent books of interest.
Reading D~fense Nationale
The writer read DN selectively and scrutinized an article or
c.i. only if it concerned itself with one or more of the following
topics:
(1) French policy toward the United States, the Soviet
Union, NATO, or the Soviet Bloc;
(2) U.S., Soviet, NATO, or Soviet bloc policy vis-a-vis
one another or France;
(3) French weapons developments, defense policy, military
capabilities, or military activities but not as these
related to French colonies or Third World nations;
(4) U.S. and/or Soviet weapons developments, defense policies,
military capabilities, or military activities but not as
these were inspired by purposes other than keeping the
other superpower's military in check;*
*In contrast, excluded from consideration were articles that, e.g.,
dealt with U.S. activities aimed at checking rebel, guerilla, or
insurgent activities in Third World countries or with U.S. aid in-
tended to help Israel check or balance the Arabs.
(5) the defense of Western Europe as a whole, or
Central Europe/West Germany, or of France;
(6) control of or hegemony in the various seas or
oceans of the world;
(7) deterrence, war, military strategy or tactics (as,
e.g., articles dealing with strategy in the nuclear
age) but excluding articles dealing with guerilla war.
The above criteria were intended to guide the selection
process so that only relevant articles or c.i.1s - relevant in the
sense of containing military comparisons - would "surface" for
investigation. I started with criteria which were very vague and
refined them in the process of almost cover-to-cover reading of the
journals for 1955-56 and 1965-66. That reading, plus further
sampling, made it clear that, because of consistently low utility,
one could eliminate from further consideration the "Bibliography"
section, the "Overseas" section of the Chronicle, and articles
published under the recurring rubrics: "Science and Technology"
and "Economic Facts".
The process of selecting articles or c.i.'s for scrutiny
began with a review of titles. Onthat basis alone, some seemed
obtiously worthy of investigation while others seemed just as
Qbviously irrelevant--the latter being immediately dropped from
consideration. Titles on a third group were sufficiently tanta-
lizing or ambiguous to rate reading the introductory and closing
paragraphs as well as scanning the material in between. All articles
or c.i.'s deemed worthy of investigation were then read to see if
they actually did contain balance comparisons. In all, 258 articles
and 77 c.i.'s were sources for the data presented in this report.
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Admittedly both the criteria for selection and the method
described above were by no means foolproof. The selection process
is just one of a number of areas in this study where this author
had to make judgments and, in a cumulative sense, important judgments
as to "what waL in" and "what was out" -- in this case what articles
or c.i.'s were to be retained as possible sources of data and which
were not. It might have been possible to make the selection process
both speedier and less subjective by deciding ahead of time, for
example, to read thoroughly every third article or c.i. and code
only those balance comparisons which by chance were contained therein.
I chose not to do that on the conviction that too much relevant data
would be lost and that I would be wasting my time in reading articles,
for instance, whose titles or scanning indicated a high probability
that they had little or no value for the purposes of this study.
Coding Ddfense Nationale
Coding Defense Nationale meant answering as many of the
following questions as possible relative to the military capabilities
being compared therein:
(1) What military capabilities are being compared?
(2) Whose capabilities are being compared?
(3) Which side does the DN author see as superior at the
time of writing?
(4) Does the DN author qualify his conclusion by bringing
out contrasting information?
(5) What justifications does the author provide for his
conclusions?
(6) What sources does the author indicate provided him
information about the balance or the capabilities being
compared?
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(7) What events does he acknowledge as trigge.ring his
thinking about the balance?
(8) What recommendations does he make in view of the
state of the balance as he perceives it?
Each of these will be elaborated on in turn.
Question #1
As with the selection process criteria, this writer had a
loose set of military capabilities categories which were refined
over time. The categories finally settled on as of primary
concern were comparisons of:
- general military power or war-winning capabilities
- overall strategic nuclear capabilities
- strategic nuclear bombs and warheads
- strategic missiles (aqgregating references to strategic
missiles - in-general, land based ICBMs, and SLBMs)
- ballistic-missile submarines
- strategic aviation/strategic bombers
- overall conventional and ground forces capabilities
- overall naval capabilities
- overall air capabilities*
As appropriate, future chapters contain remarks highlighting
salient features of individual categories. For the most part,
attempts to define each formally were abandoned since definitions
tended to be tautological and not very useful. In the overwhelming
majority of cases, there was little difficulty in deciding under
*In the appendices are found some of the data gathered on compari-
sons of secondary interest. These include subsets of the above -
e.g., comparisont. of cruisers or fighter aircraft as subsets of the
naval and air balances respectively.
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which category a comparison belonged. For example, authors would
simply come out and say something to the effect that one side had
nuclear, conventional, or naval superiority or more aad/or better
missiles, bombers, ships, and the like. Of course, different authors
may have had different conceptions as to what they meant by what they
said. Ready examples are comparisons of strategic missiles and of
strategic aviation. Some authors seemed to view strategic missiles
as strictly meaning land-based ICBMs and SLBMs while others said,
implied (or possibly even kept to themselves) that they understood
strategic missiles also to include MR and IRBMs. For one group
strategic aviation seemed to entail only bombers capable of striking
one superpower's homeland by taking off from the other's while a
second group seemed to consider European-based U.S. tactical air-
craft as strategic bomber assets. In coding, this writer did not
control for such differences since attempting to do so turned out
to be too complicated and time consuming, especially in light of one
multitude of other variables which had to be dealt with in the
study.
Partly for the same reasons, some comparisons of more or less
different capabilities were grouped together in one category. For
exampl,, DN authors, particularly in the early years of the study,
would comment on the strategic missile balance but when going into
detail would often mention only land-based ICBMs. Were they thinking
of SLBMs but simply not mentioning them? Were they equating the
iand-based ICBM balance with the strategic missile balance in general?
Sometimes the answers to these questions were impossible to determine.
How then should one code those references: under a "strategic
missiles-in-general" or a "land-based ICBM" category? Analogously,
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how should one code general assertions about Soviet conventional
superiority when the only examples an author gives deal with ground
forces capabilities? For the sake of simplicity and expeditiousness,
this writer's solution was to form a category aggregating the different
capabilities and to code problematic comparisons once underneath it.
Some comparisons were potentially problematic in a similar but
yet slightly different fashion. For example, all war-winning compari-
sons were coded under the "general military power or war-winning
capability" heading except those- restricted to assessing which side
might win in a strategic nuclear exchange. The latter were viewed
as overall strategic nuclear balance comparisons. On occasion a DN
author would make the point that neither superpower would emerge a
winner in a future war against the other since the war would be
catastrophic for both. An implication of his statement is that the
author probably viewed any future war as basically nuclear even
though he never mentioned nuclear weapons. Because no such mention
was made, these references were coded with the general military
power group, but one should not ignore that they possibly could
(should?) have been coded in the strategi- nuclear category.
Sometimes a more difficult task than categorizing comparisons
was deciding if a comparison was intended in the first place. Two
authors both made the point in 1960 that the United States with its
Polaris missile program would compensate for Soviet superiority in
land-based ICBMs. Were the authors intending an SLBM comparison
here, one that had the U.S. ahead even though they made no mention
of Soviet SLBMs? Based on investigation of context, this writer
answered in the affirmative and coded accordingly.
On occasion, reference was made to both superpowers in such a
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way as to place them in a class by themselves, implying a comparison
that had them roughly equal. More than one article, e.g., contained
the admonition that France must continue her force de frappe and
related delivery system programs even though she had no hope of
ratching U.S. or Soviet capabilities. In comparing France with
both superpowers, was not the DN author in a sense also comparing
both superpowers, implying some measure of equality between them
since they together (rather than just one) set the norm, the
standard, against which the French program was being measured?
This writer thought so.
A central concept of this study, the word "balance" ("equilibre"
in the French), was itself a source of uncertainty as to whether a
comparison was intended. At times the term was used such that it
was not clear if the DN author meant that the superpowers were in
balance, meaning equal, or whether they were actors in a balance.
whatever the actual state of the balance (in terms of one side
being superior) might be. F-r instance, it is not entirely clear
how an author views the balance when he writes: "French policy
cannot ignore the nuclear balance existing between the superpowers."
This writer had to make a careful study of the context in order to
decide whether to code such a reference. If nothing in the con-
text suggested that the DN author viewed both sides as equal, then
the reference was not coded.
A frequently recurring situation - indeed, one which reflected
standard operating procedure in the chronicles - was 5or a DN author
to quote or paraphrase without -omment someone else's views on a
balance. Since the purpose of this study is to present DN perceptions
of the balances, it did not make sense for this writer to code, e.g.,
Chairman Khrushchev's or Secretary MacNamara's views if these were
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presented in.strictly repoitorial fashion. Hence, comparisons
were coded only if the DN authors seemed to subscribe or accept
the viev.s in question. Contextual analysis was the method utilized
to resolve tmbiguous cases.
Finally, no matter how often an author stated in his piece that
one side was ahead in a particular area, his comparison was coded
only once. Also, when the author's focus did not go beyond
quantitative comparison of total hardware associated with a balance,
his comparison wa3 coded under that balance but with the specific
proviso that it was quantitative only. The same coding rule applied
when an author did not go beyond comparing the technical quality
of the hardware.
Question #2
Question #2 is concerned with specifying whose capabilities are
being compared. While the main thrust of this project is to reach
conclusions about U.S. and Soviet (i.e., US-SU) balances, it was
thought useful to code NATO/West vs. Soviet Unicn/Soviet bloc (i.e.,
N/W - S/S) balances. Coding the latter helps to put into perspective
the context in which individual balances were generally viewed
by allowing one to answer questions such as: Is the naval balance
viewed more in US-SU or N/S-S/S terms?
The Soviet Union was singled out as an entity on the S/S side
since there were many articles or items which specifically compared
NATO or Western capabilities against those of the Soviet Union alone
vice the Warsaw Pact or Soviet bloc. In contrast, this writer cannot
recall any comparisons involving the U.S. alone versus the Soviet
bloc/Warsaw Pact. No more than a handful of Soviet comparisons
involved or implied that China was a member of the bloc.
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Since the United States and Soviet Union were viewed as being
the undisputed primary competitors in all aspects of strategic
weapons and delivery systems, all comparisons relative to these systems
were coded as US-SU balances. This coding rule applied regardless of
whether the journal author may have referred to "East versus West"
rather than to the superpowers per se when making strategic system
comparisons.
Questions 3 & 4
These questions are concerned with the DN author's conclusions
as to which side was ahead at the time of writing and whether there
was mention of any contrasting trends pointing out, e.g., that, while
one side was superior, the other was closing the gap. Difficulty
in coding responses to both questions did not happen frequently.
Already mentioned have been those situations where DN authors talked
of the U.S. and Soviets as being in a class by themselves.* There
were also situations when some comparisons had to be coded as "split
opinions" (referred to as "s.o.'s"). These occurred either because
the authors were ambiguous or undecided as to whether one side was
ahead or equal or because they had one side ahead in some circum-
stances and its adversary ahead in others.
Question #5
This question is concerned with the justifications an author
provided. Problems in coding responses were not infrequent and
centered mainly on whether some sta.-- nts "qualified" as justifi-
cations. Two examples will illustrate. First, if an author wrote:
"The Soviet Union has caught up with the Americans and is now at
parity," should one code the "catching up" statement as a reason or
*See above, p. 9.
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should one merely regard it as another way of saying that the
Soviets were behind and are now equal? Second, if an author states
that a Soviet missile shot demonstrates Soviet ICBM superiority,
later adding that the Soviets are ahead in missile fuels and speed
but not in accuracy, should one code the fuel and speed assertions
as justifications. For the sake of completeness, the author decided
to code these and similar cases--particularly those, such as in the
second example, where it "made sense" to do so.
Question #6
Question #6--What sources of information are acknowledged?--was
among the easiest to deal with and needs little elaboration. Either
a source was mentioned or it was not. A source usually consisted of
an article, book, report, person, group, or agency
Question #7
Question #7--What triggering events were acknowledged?--was, in
contrast, one of the most difficult to deal with. The writer origi-
nally intended to code only specific events such as the Sputnik I
launching or the Cuban missile crisis but from time-to-time had to
deal with vaguer references (as, e.g., "U.S. and Soviet strategic
developments in the last year"). These were coded also since they
were acknowledged as triggering an author's thinking.
Tn some articles a problem arose when the author would make some
conclusion about an overall balance and elaborate by making conclusions
about its constituent sub-balances. One event wouJd be acknowledged
as triggering the whole thought process. Should that event, then,
have been coded only for the overall balance o,: for the constituent
sub-balances also? For this study, they were recorded for each
comparison.
Many times an author would begin an article by focussing on some
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recent event--an event which seemed as if it might have triggered
the article and comparisons contained therein. This raised the question:
Was his mentioning the event merely a stylistic device by which to
introduce the problem dealt with in the article or was it also mentioned
because it had served to trigger his thinking? Even with a careful
investigation of the context, it was often impossible to tell. Hence,
the event was not coded.
Especially because of the third problem, this writer's level of
confidence in the events data is not very high. I am not overly
concerned about the validity of what I did code, but I am concerned
about relevant data which never made it in the data set. In order to
compensate for the problem, it might have Leen useful to code the
topic or topics dealt with in relevant articles or c.i.'s.
Question #8
Question #8 re4uired coding the comparison-associated recom-
mendations made by the authors. While many were straightforward,
causing no coding problems, a large number were not directly linked
by the DN author to the comparisons with which they were associated
by this writer. It was not at all unusual for a DN author to make
comparisons in the course of an argument in which he made a number of
other points and assertions. Numerous recommendations miqht also be
made, but none would necessarily be tied in.any direct, explicit,
"cause-and-effect" manner to any of the points or comparisons made in
the argument, yet particular recommendations seemed to this writer
to flow logically from the comparisons made and hence were coded. In
so doing I constantly sought not to make connections which the DN
author simply did not intend to have made.
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Collating the Data
Collating the data meant ascertaining the trends or patterns
contained within them. The following questions guided the coding process:
(1) Did attention paid to a particular balance--where
attention is measured by frequency of comparisons--increase or
decrease?
(2) How do the balances rank relative to one another in
terms of the frequency in which they appeared?
(3) What are the trends in perceptions about the state
of each balance? Which balances seem ,iost favorable for the U.S.?
The Soviet Union? Which are most often perceived as in parity?
(4) What are the trends as to sources of information and
triggering events?
(5) What patterns exist as to policy recomnmndations,
especially if one links recommendations to their associated balance
perceptions?
(6) As an indicator of the context in which the balances
are viewed, do US-SU or N/W-S/S comparisons appear more frequently
and do balance perceptions in one context differ significantly from
those in the other?
Comments on the Data Base and Generalizations Made Therefrom
I have highlighted some of the problems associated with accumu-
lating the data for this study. It should now be obvious that,
because of the many judgments involved, coding Defense Nationale
was both art and science. To have made it more purely scientific,
i.e., more purely replicable, would have required developing either
an overabundance of coding rules or leaving out relevant materials.
The price of my proceeding as I did is that the numbers presented
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in upcoming chapters should be viewed only as approximations of the
frequency of the phenomena counted. Even as approximations, however,
they provided the basis for making valid generalizations in response
to the questions which guided the collating process. With the
exceptions of the triggering events data and the data relevant to
the general military power and war winning capability balance, my
level of confidence in the generalizations is high. I have already
elaborated on my reservations as to the former exception. * Con-
cerning the latter, I do not feel that from the data I can give an
accurate picture or rundown of DN perceptions. There were too many
unresolvable, potentially relevant, ambiguous references which I
felt forced to leave out. There were many references, e.g., to
Soviet or American power in general which seemed to be military-as-
sociated but were never clear enough to rate coding. Because of my
low level of confidence, I have placed the general military power/war
winning capability information in Appendix II.
*See above, pp. 12-13.
PART II
STRATEGIC BALANCES





THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE
Introduction
The strategic nuclear balance (or SNB) category includes all
comparisons of U.S. and Soviet capabilities to win a nuclear
exchange and/or inflict nuclear destruction. It also encompass-s
three references restricted to comparing overall strategic nuclear
aelivery capabilities. It does not include references concerned
with comparing more specific capabilities such as strategic missile
systems per se or nuclear bombs. These are dealt with under other
categories.
Since this category is more amorphous than others, it seems
useful to present examples of comparisons coded as SNB references:
- a 1956 reference that both sides could reciprocally
neutralize one another not only because of the number of
atomic weapons each had but also because of the delivery
systems and strategic nuclear defense systems possessed
by both sides.
- a 1958 reference that since the U.S. homeland was now
vulnerable, both sides were in a situation of approxi-
mate nuclear equality.
- a 1961 reference to the effect that victory no longer
meant anything in a nuclear war and that both sides
would be annihilated.
- a 1966 raference to "Soviet inferiority in the nuclear
war area" since it was inferior in megatonnage, missile
numbers, and missile protection.
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- a 1970 reference that the U.S. and the S.U. realized
the necessity to maintain the nuclear equilibrium,
i.e., not disturb the actual equilibrium of strategic
forces.
Table 1 presents and summarizes data on the frequency of SNB
comparisons and on DN perceptions of the state of that balance.
With 201 comparisons, the SNB far exceeded all others in frequency.
The number of comparisons (31) was relatively low in the first
five year period, but it then moved upward quickly and remained
between 55 and 58 in each of the remaining three. Beginning with
1959, no year had less than 9 comparisons nor more than 15.
Balance Perceptions
Overwhelmingly the balance was perceived as in parity (168
comparisons and 2 s.o.) with the number of "pro-U.S." perceptions
being small (28 ahd 2 s.o.) but somewhat respectable when con-
sidered with the unexpectedly low number (3) of "pro-Soviet"
comparisons. In the three five-year periods between 1960 and
1974, the number of equality comparisons fluctuated in rough inverse
proportion to the number of "pro-U.S." and "S.U," comparisons. The
same phenomenon occurred in the 1957 - '58 time frame with the U.S.
"benefitting" as the ratio shifted in its favor even though the Sputnik
launch and other Soviet space spectaculars might have led one to
hypothesize the opposite.*
Indeed, it was surprising the Soviets did not do better,
particularly in the "missile gap" (1957-1961) and SALT (1970-1974)
years. The three favorable Soviet comparisons did occur during the
*However, in line with such a hypothesis is that 3 of the 4 "pro-U.S."
comparisons in 1958 were qualified by pointing out that the balance






28 + 2 s.o. favored U.S.
3 favored S.U.
168 + 2 s.o. indicated equality
BREAKDOWN PER FIVE-YEAR PERIOD Number of
U.S. S.U. Split Opinions Comparisons
1955-1959 6 3 121 1 1 (TT-- nr r 11
1960-1964 4 53 1 (U.S. or E.) 58
1965-1969 13 1 44 57
1970-1974 5 50 - 55
YEARLY BREAKDOWN
1955 1 1 (U.S. or Eq.)a 2
1956 3 3
1957 1b 1 7 9
1958 4c id 3 8
1959 1 8 e 9
1960 15f is
1961 - I (t7; n P )9 10
1962 1 9 h 10
1963 1 12 114
1964 2 8 . 10
1965 5i  4 _9
1966 33 11 14
1967 9 9
1968 2k  11 .... 13
1969 31 9 12
1970 1m 8 9
1971 10 10
1972 1' 13 14
1973 20 7 9
1974 1 12 13
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Footnotes for Table 1
(a) Author said U.S. lost its sizable lead due to Soviet bomber
progress.
(b) Comparison restricted to assessing which side had the better
capability in nuclear weapons carriers as a group.
(c) One comparison qualified by saying that balance would surely
move to equality. Second comparison qualified by saying
S.U. was developing capability to neutralize U.S. even if U.S.
had numerical superiority. Third comparison qualified by
saying U.S. superiority margin was decreasing.
(d) Qualified by saying balance could shift as U.S. developed
missiles.
(e) One ccmparison qualified by saying superioritl could be
expected to shift back and forth.
(f) One comparison restricted to assessing which side had the
better capability in nuclear weapons carriers as a group.
(g) Author ambiguous.
(h) One comparison qualified by saying breakthrough could occur
giving one side the edge.
(i) One comparison qualified by saying it was wise to project
alternating cycles of superiority. Second comparison qualified
by noting that Soviets had sufficient capability to neutralize
U.S.
(j) One comparison quaiified by saying that, even with the U.S.
lead, both the U.S. and S.U. were in a balance of terror
situation.
(k) One comparison qualified by saying that U.S. quantitative lead
in strategic weapons systems was being closed and that Soviet
missiles had more throw-weight and thrust. A second
comparison qualified by saying that, while U.S. was superior
quantitatively and qualitatively, the balance was moving towards
equality.
(1) One comparison qualified by saying, "In view of the constraints
of the Vietnam War, the United States has progressively lost
a large part of its margin of nuclear superioriti over the
USSR. The way things are going, a balance coule be reached by
1972." A second reference was restricted to comparing the
number of strategic weapons carriers each side possessed. It
was qualified by stressing need for U.S. to counter continued
Soviet growth in ICBMs.
(m) Comparison qualified by saying S.U. was not far from achieving
parity.
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pootnotes for Table 1 (continued)
(nW Comparison qualified in that Soviets were 
closing gap and
had an adequate second strike, in effect placing them
in a situation equilibrium with U.S. even if they did not
have parity.
(o) One comparison qualitative only, focussing on technology
associated with the strategic nuclear balance.
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"missile gap" years, but their number is very small relative to
the 48 other comparisons made in the same period. 7n the SALT
years Soviet strategic buildups were making themselves felt to
the point of giving the USSR numerical superiority in the SALT I
agreement but not felt enough to give the Soviets "pro-S.U."
comparisons in Defense Nationale.*
In line with this writer's expectations, the U.S. made its
strongest showing in the mid-to-late sixties. These were the years
when Kennedy- and MacNamara-inspired strategic buildups were
reaching their peaks..
As for equality comparisons, their distribution was wide-
spread particularly after 1958 when only two years (1965 and 1973)
had less than 8 equality references. The high year was 1960 with
15, and the high five-year period was the second with 53. The
number dipped somewhat (to 44) in the third five-year period (the
peak years of the Kennedy-MacNamara buildup) but shifted upward
again (to 50) in the fourth period (the years of the Soviet buildup).
Justifications
DN authors justified 21 "pro-U.S." comparisons. In essence all
argued (with varying degrees of detail or corroborating evidence)
that the U.S. had or was developing better strategic strike or
retaliatory response capabilities. In 1961 through 1966 DN authors
particularly emphasized U.S. efforts to'maintain a second strike
capability either by projecting its retaliatory forces or building
up its missi±e inventory such that it had co'mter-force or escalation
*In both periods, however, the U.S. did "suffer" so to speak. As
pointed out in the previous footnote, 3 of the 4 "pro-U.S." compar-
isons in 1958 were qualified. Also there no "pro-U.S." references
in 1959, 1960, and 1961. In the 5 SALT years there were only 5
comparisons favoring the Americans in contrast to 13 in the previous
5 years.
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options not available to the Soviets. Indeed, in two of these
(1965 and 1966), the authors doubted that the Soviets were
economically capable of matching U.S. efforts. As the Soviets
did increase their missile numbers and throw-weight, the writers
focussed more and more on the significance of the U.S. qualitative
superiority in strategic systems or the U.S. lead in warheads (the
two sometimes being equated). This was the case in all explanations
presented in 1968 dnd beyond. Only one author (1972) emphasized
that this decisive qualitative advantage was only temporary since
the Soviets were also working on MIRV technology.
Four pro-U.S. justifications (2 in 1965, one each in 1970 and
1974) involved a fairly detailed rundown of the superpower strategic
arsenals. An additional two (1962 and 1964) involved a rundown of
only the U.S. arsenal though in one (1964) the author made the point
that the U.S. had twice as much strategic nuclear "potential" as the
Soviets. The remaining justifications were restricted to focussing
on one or a small number of factors such as the U.S. qualitative
edge, U.S. superiority in missile or warhead numbers, and the like.
Other than in the detailed justifications mentioned earlier, the
U.S, lead in strategic bombers was mentioned 4 times (1957, 1958,
1960 and 1961) and served as an important reason why DN authors
rated the U.S. superior in the "missile gap" years.
Of the three pro-Soviet comparisons, only two were justified.
The Soviet launching of two satellites was justification enough for
a 1957 author. His counterpart in 1958 went into greater detail,
citing what he viewed as Soviet superiority in missile delivery
systems, Soviet possession of FBM boats at a time when the U.S.
was still building theirs, and the aging (in 1958!) of U.S. B-52
aircraft and their high susceptibility to dest:uction uithc; in the
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ground or in the air. The third writer did not feel any need to
explain his views, referring to the Soviet position as of one of
"obvious superiority."
As stated earlier, the numerical superiority given the USSR
in SALT I did not result in any"pro-Soviet"comparisons. Instead,
the SALT I accords were viewed on at least five occasions from 1972
to 1974 as "codifying" parity. That viewpoint is not inconsistent
with the constantly recurring reason (appearing 98 times) justifying
equality compariions: the DN authors' belief that the superpowers
were in a situation of strategic nuclear sufficiency or balance of
terror. This thought was often accompanied by the assertion that
numbers no longer counted, for, even if one side were quantitatively
inferior, it was in effect equal if it had enough to deter and
neutralize the other. Sometimes mentioned independently, but more
often in conjunction with the sufficiency reason, was the point
that the Soviets, because of their delivery system programs, had
finally "caught up" with the United States. On three occasions
(all in 1974) continued U.S. qualitative superiority was the reason
which justified rating both sides as equal even though the Soviets
did have numerical superiority in missiles.
Most DN authors did not bother to provide detailed corroborating
evidence for their equality views. In fact, only 3, for example,
went into detailed comparative investigation of the strategic nuclear
capabilities of the two powers.
Sources of Information
DN authors acknowledged sources of information in 18 articles or
c.i.'s. The most frequently mentioned sources (occurring in 10
articles or c.i.'s)were associated with the U.S. legislative or
25
executive branches and particularly with the latter. These are |
identified below together with the year they appeared:
- Senator Symington, Admiral Rickover, and the budget
submission to Congress (1958)
- General Powers (head of SAC) and the budget submission
to Congress (1959)
- the Defense Department and the budget submission to
Congress (1962)
- Secretary of Defense's Annual Report (1964)
- the Defense Department (1965)
- Secretary MacNamara (1967)
- Secretary MacNamara (1968)
- Dr. John Foster (1968)
- the JCS Chairman's Annual Report and the Secretary
of Defense's Annual Report (1973)
- the JCS Chairman's Annual Report, the Secretary of
Defense's Annual Report, and Secretary ScIsinger's
testimony (1974)
Publications of the London Institute for Strategic Studies
figured in 3 comparisons. These were Strategic Survey of 1967
(mentioned in 1968) and Military Balance for both 1970-1971 and
1972-1973 (mentioned in 1970 and 1972 respectively). U.S. News
and World Report was acknowledged twice (both times in 1962) as
was Aviation Week (once in 1958 and again in 1969). The 1969-1970
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Y was cited
in 1971.
Triggering Events
Most triggering events can be grouped under a number of
headings. The largest group (18 events) is associated in one way
or another with arms control. Only two occurred before 1970 - a
Soviet disarmament proposal (1959) and the signing of the Limited
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963). The remn-.ning 16 appeared from 1970
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through 1974. Fourteen dealt with the SAL, CSCE, or MBFR talks.
Either alone or in conjunction with the ethers, SALT events were
mentioned 11 times, MBFR events 6 times and CSCE events 5 times.
Occurring once each were: (1) the U.N. General Assembly vote on a
treaty barring weapons of mass destruction on the ocean floor (1972)
and (2) talk in the U.S. about the U.S. troop withdrawal from
Europe (1973).,
The second largest group involves 12 NATO or Western alliance
events. Ten of these dealt with meetings between two or more high
level Western officials to discuss common foreign and defense
policy:
- meeting of Western leaders to work out a common
Western approach for the Paris summit (1960)
- meeting of American and French Presidents plus the
Canadian and British Prime Ministers (1960)
- Henry Kissinger, as representative for JFK, discussed
military strategy with W. German leaders (1961)
- Dean Rusk met with NATO leaders (1962)
- MacMillan and Kennedy meeting in the Bahamas to discuss
the Skybolt system (occurred twice in 1963 as a TE)
- NATO Parliamentarians meeting (1965)
- NATO Council's adoption of flexible response as NATO
strategy (1968)
- Washington meeting on the occasion of NATO's 25th
anniversary (occurred twice in 1974).
The remaining events were: (1) the Atlantic Institute's
review of NATO (1964) and (2) NATO's 20th anniversary (1969).
In 11 instances the publication of a book, article, or report
was sufficient to trigger thinking:
- an article by Henry Kissinger in Deadulus on U.S.
military strategy (1961)
- an U.S. News and World Report article on the U.S. nuclear
arsenal (1961)
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- a U.S. News and World Report article on U.S.-Soviet
strategic missiles 
(1963)
- publication of the naval annuals, official notices,
and end-of-the-year articles on navies (all of which
triggered thinking on the ballistic missile boat
balance and consequently to the strategic balance) (1968)
- a book by G. Rathjens on the future of the strategic
arms race (1969)
- current issue of Military Balance (1970)
- the SIPRI Yearbook for 1969-70 (1971)
- Neville Brown's study on the future of Europe (1972)
- current issue of Military Balance (1972)
- the Secretary of Defense's Annual Report (1974)
- the JCS Chairman's Annual Report
Three groups of events all occurred 8 times each. The first
consists of U.S. military policy debates, decisions, or announcements:
- promulgation of U.S. defense budgets and associated
advocacy of flexible response (1962)
- debate in the U.S. over strategic nuclear weapons
developments (1966)
- MacNamara'a announcement of the U.S, decision on ABM
(1967)
- statements by various high U.S. officials that the
Soviet Union was pulling ahead militarily (1968)
- Congressional vote on ABM (1968)
- Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's advocacy of a new
strategic targetting doctrine (occurred in 3 instances
in 1974).
The second unites together four crises: These involved Suez
(1957), Berlin (twice in 1959 and once in 1960), missiles in Cuba
(three times in 1962 and 1963), and Czechoslovakia (1968).
The third group encompasses Soviet achievements, statements,
actions or (in one case) inaction. Four were space - or missile -
related: 3 dealing with Sputnik launches and ICBM developments
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(in 1957 and '59) and one with cosmonaut Titov's space flight
(1961). The remaining four were: (1) Soviet advocacy of peaceful
coexistence in 1960; (2) Marshal Malinovski's announcement at the
Twenty-Second CPSU Congress (1961) that the Soviet Union had solved
the problem of interdicting missiles in flight; (3) Soviet demonstra-
tion of missile power at the 1967 Moscow October Revolution Day
Parade; and (4) Moscow's passivity to U.S. plans to cut back forces
in Germany.
French achievements, declarations, or announcements triggered
thinking on 6 occasions. Four were associated with "force de frappe"
developments (twice in 1960, once in 1963 and 1970); one with a French
decision on construction of ballistic missile submarines (1966) cnd
one with France's decision to pull out of the NATO military structure
(1966).
Events involving leadership changes were instrumental 3 tifes
and NATO maneuvers twice (the latter in 1955 and 1961). The leader-
ship changes included the nomination of Maxwell Taylor (advocate of
flexible response) to be "military representative of the President"
U1961), Adenauer's retirement (1963), and Lyndon Johnson's election
as President (1965).
The following events were each mentioned once:
- international meeting of experts or, the
prevention of surprise attack (1959)
- Britain's r~nunciation of the Blue Streak missile system
(1960)
- W. German rearmament developments (1960)
- the recent trend toward Soviet - U.S. detente (1964)
- U.S. doing away with the B-47 (1965)
- U.S. talks with China (1971)
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Recommendations
With varying frequency, there were essentially seven recom-
mendations made by DN authors. The one which recurref most frequently
(47 times) was a recommendation that France (either alone or some-
times in concert with other European states) should develop a force
de frappe. In all cases except three, it occurred when the balance
was perceived as in equality. The exceptions were in 1957 when the
Soviets were perceived as superior and in 1958 when the U.S. was
perceived as superior in two qualified comparisons.
It is difficult to discern any identifiable pattern in the
distribution of these recommendations. Per five-year period the
distribution was 8, 10, 12, and 16, possibly indicating an
increasing tendency in the last few years to have France develop
her own force or work with her neighbors for a European system.
Force de frappe recommendations were often accompanied by a
number of assertions. One was that the U.S. should not be counted
on to "trade New York for Paris" with the Soviets achieving sufficiency
or better. Two closely related assertions were that France (and/or
Europe) could not achieve status as a great power or as a partner
equal to the U.S. in Western Alliance deliberations without possessing
nuclear weapons. On a few occasions these last two were accompanied
by the thought that France must do what is necessary to prevent a
superpower condominium dictating to her, Europe, or the world.
Occurring 37 times were recommendations that called for members
of the Western Alliance to increase their capabilities for flexible
response so as to avoid, in an age of sufficiency on both sides, the
prospect of suicide or defeat - the latter reflecting perceived Soviet
conventional superiority in the European theater. These recomnendation:
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were associated with perceived strategic equality in all but two
cases (a qualified "pro-U.S." comparison in 1958 and an unqualified
one in 1965). Their distribution suggests a general trend of
decreased frequency. The breakdown per five-year period in 10, 12,
9, and 5 recommendations.
One should not be surprised that DN authors did, in relatively
good numbers, recommend flexible response. Still, if one considers
that President de Gaulle opposed flexible response and advocated
continued reliance on massive retaliation, one might not have
hypothesized such a high relative frequency. It seems particularly
high when compared to the relatively small number of times (8) when
de Gaulle's views were advocated (all between 1960 and 1969).
Massive retaliation supporters saw flexible response as serving
only to invite conventional Soviet aggression against Western Europe.
These arguments all followed equality comparisons except in one case
where the U.S. was perceived as superior.
Twenty recommendations called upon the West to react to Soviet
psychological, subversive, or politico - economic warfare in Third
World countries and/or in Western Europe. All except one (a 1971
recommendation) occurred between 1957 and 1964 (13 in 1957 to 1960
alone). They are consistent with Khrushchev's tenure in office
and his advocacy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West and support
for "wars of national liberation" in developing states. All reflect
perceptions of equality and the accompanying belief of DN authors
that,with strategic sufficiency and balance of terror, the Soviets
were confident they could deter Western nuclear pressure as they
sought to increase by non-military means their political leverage
throughout the world.
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Ten recommendations supported the view that strategic nuclear
stability was a desirable situation and that the balance should
not be upset. The ten occurred in 1957, 1961, 1966 through 1971,
and in 1974. For the most part, these were accompanied by the
thought that neither side should increase their nuclear power or
seek some kind of advantage. On one occasion (196?), the DN
author was clearly concerned that the U.S. might fall behind and
called upon it to insure it did not do so. All but one (a 1974
"pro-U.S." comparison) were made in conjunction with equality
comparisons.
Two recommendations appeared seven times or less. These were
that (1) both sides should pursue nuclear arms limitation talks
(recommended twice in 1960 and five times in the SALT period from
1969 through 1972) and (2) that the West must exhibit unhesitating
will to use nuclear weapons in case of Soviet aggression (once each
in 1956, 1957, and 1965). With one exception, these occurred with
equality comparisons. The second recommendation was made once in
conjunction with a "pro-U.S." reference '1965).
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CHAPTER III
THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BOMBS AND WARHEAD BALANCE
Introduction
This category includ,.s references comparing which side had
more and/or better bombs and warheads, more associated mega-
tonnage, or better bomb and warhead development programs. Some
comparisons dealt only with bombs or only with warheads while
others dealt with both as a group and were so coded. In most
cases identifying comparisons for coding was a relatively simple
task, but there was difficulty in ascertaining if megatonnage
comparisons dealt with total megatonnage or with warhead mega-
tonnage only. This writer did not control for the difference.
As per Table 2, there were 22 comparisons with each five-
year period having 6 or 7 except the second, which had only 2.
For the most part, comparisons prior to 1963 dealt with bombs
only and those after 1964 with bombs and warheads together or
warheads only.
Balance Perceptions
DN authors most frequently--i.e., in about half the cases--
saw this balance as favoring the U.S., especially from 1965 on.
They least frequently saw it favoring the Soviets, who were
rated ahead 3 times (plus 1 s.o.) and only in references restricted
to comparing megatonnage. There were 7 equality comparisons, 6 of
which were made prior to 1963.
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Table 2
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BOMBS AND WARHEADS
BALANCE PERCEPTIONS
Of 22 comparisons
11 + 1 so favored U.S.
3 + I so favored S.U.
7 indicated equality
BREAKDOWN PER FIVE-YEAR PERIOD Number of
LU U. Ea. I Snlit Opnon Comparisons
1955-1959 2 + 4 6
1960-1964 -2.
1965-1969 . 2 - 7












1965 lc  .. 1




1969 2d le . _3
1970 if 1
1971 lf  . 1
1972 1 1
1973 1g 1h 2




Footnotes for Table 2
(a) Qualified by saying both had enough bombs to meet their
objectives.
(b) Restricted to quantitative comp. ison of bomb stocks.
(c) All comparisons from 1965 through 1968 were megatonnage only.
(d) One reference restricted to quantitative comparison of
both bombs and warheads.
(e) Megatonnage comparison only.
(f) References for 1'70 and 1971 were restricted to quantitative
comparisons of boxh bombs and warheads.
(g) Quantitative comparison of warheads only.
(h) Megatonnage comparison.
i) Ditto footnote (g) above.
(j) DJ author saw U.S. as superior in warheads and S.U. in
megatonnage. Megatonnage reference qualified by saying
that the U.S. was not behind if one adopted Pentagon con-




Thirteen comparisons (including the "S.U." part of the 1974
s.o.) were strictly quantitative and need no elaboration. Four
other comparisons were justified. Two (one in 1969 and one in
1974) dealt with U.S. superiority in warheads, and both entailed
emphasis on U.S. development and deployment of MIRVs with one
(1969) also citing U.S. miniaturization technology as evidence
of U.S. superiority. The remaining two were Justifications of
equality perceptions. One author (1960) accepted the results
of Soviet nuclear tests as proof that the Soviets had reached
the level of the U.S. in bomb developments. A second (1962)
relied upon agreement among the CIA, the AEC, the Pentagon,
and the President's advisers that the Soviets could construct
warheads equal to the U.S. In addition, he also referred to
tests which inoicated Srviet progress in warhead detonators.
Sources of Information
Sources of information were acknowledged on four occasions:
-The CIA, AEC, Pentagon, and the President's advisors
(1962).
-The Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense (1969).
-The current issue of Military Balance (1970).
-The Annual Report of the JCS Chairman.
Triggering Events
DN authors acknowledged triggering events on 13 occasions,
and it seems best simply Lo list them below in chronological
order:
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-British H-bomb developments (1956)
-The Berlin crisis and related boasting by Soviet military
leaders of Soviet military superiority (1959)
-U.S. resumption of ni lear weapons tests (1962)
-U.S.-Soviet strategi( nuclear balance developments
in the preceding year (1966)
-Statements by high American officials that the U.S. was
falling behind militarily (1968)
-Publication of the Annual Report of the Secretary of
Defense (1969)
-Publication of the 1969-1970 Military Balance, which
triggered thinking because it did not go into the warhead
area (1969)
-Publication of the 1970-71 Military Balance (1970)
-President Nixon's reelection victory (1973)
-Ongoing CSCE, MBFR, and SALT II negotiations (i'73)
-Announcement and alaborition of Secretary Schlesinger's
targeting doctrine (twice in 1974)
Recommendations
There were three recommendations, and all followed equality
comparisons:
-Especially because of parity, the Soviets are posing a
challenge to the West in the Third World and the West
must react (1960),
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-U.S. resumption of nuclear weapons testing is under-
standable and necessary (1962).
-France was right to develop its force de frappe because





The "strategic missiles (aggregate)" heading encompasses
references to strategic missiles-in-general, land-based ICBMs,and
SLBMs. Comparisons were readily identifiable and dealt either with
which side had more and/or better missiles or better associated
development programs. For the purposes of convenience and of
presenting data in the most informative manne:-, it is best to deal
first in detail with subsets of the overall heading and at the end
to aggreq.te all frequency and balance perceptions data into one
table.
STRATEGIC MISSILES-IN-GENERAL AND LAND-BASED ICBMs
Introduction
As already noted,* it was not always possible, particularly in
the early years, to ascertain if an author's reference was meant to
apply to strategic missiles-in-general or to land-based ICBMs only.
Hence, for the purposes of coding and tabulation, these were grouped
together. In three articles or c.i.'s, the authors clearly
differentiated and separately compared U.S. and Soviet capabilities
in both areas. Each comparison was separately coded.
As seen in Table 3, there were 42 comparisons toto. With 16
comparisons, the immediate post-Sputnik period (1958-1960) seems to
be one of particularly strong DN concern. In contrast, the years
1961 through '64 and 1972 through '74 seem to reflect decreased con-
cern with only 2 and 3 comparisons respectively. Strictly quantita-
tive references were very prominent after 1961, accounting for 14 of
the 23 comparisoi.s from 1962 through 1974.
*See above, p. 7.
39
Table 3
STRATEGIC MISSILES-IN-GENERAL AND LAND-BASED ICBMs
BALANCE PERCEPTIONS
Of 42 comparisons
__ 1.1 + 3 so favored U.S.
22 + 2 so favored S.U.
6 + 1 so indicated equality
BREAKDOWN PER FIVE-YEAR PERIOD Number of
U.S. S.U.j Ea. Split Opinions Comparisons
1955-1959 10 2 17,
1960-1964 2 5 1 (U.S. or Eq.)
1965-1969 9 1 2 1 (U.S. + S.U.) 13





1958 5 1 6
1959 4b 4






1965 3g 1 (U.S. + S.U,)h
1966 22,,, 2
1967
1968 29 1 3





1973 1 (U.S. + S.U.)P 1
1974 2q 2
_. . . . . .4
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Footnotes for Table 3
(a) Based on assumption Soviets were making progress comparable to
the Americans.
(b) One comparison qualified by saying S.U. "slightly" ahead.
Second comparison qualified by saying S.U. not more than one
year ahead.
(c) Three comparisons qualified by saying Soviet lead in missiles-
in-general (one comparison) or land-based ICBMs (two comparisons)
would be compensated for or remedied by U.S. Polaris developments.
Fourth comparison qualified by saying Soviet lead not definitive.
d) Journal author ambiguous.
Cd) Quantitative only.
(f) Quantitative only.
(g) One quantitative only. One restricted to comparing technical
quality of missiles.
(h) U.S. viewed ahead in total numbers and the Soviets ahead in the
size and power of individual rockets.
(i) One quantitative only.
(j) Both quantitative only.
(k) Both quantitative only.
(1) Both quantitative only.
Wn) Quantitative only.
(n) One quantitative only.
(o) Two quantitative only.
(p) U.S. ahead qualitatively and S.U. quantitatively though S.U,
seen p.,suing qualitative route also.
(q) Both qualified by saying that U.S. MIRV would compensate for
Soviet lead. One also viewed U.S. forward bases and strategic
bombers as compensating items.
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Balance Perceptions
The Soviets did very well in this category, receiving 24 favorable
comparisons (including 2 s.o.) vice 14 for the U.S. (including 3
s.o.) and 7 (with 1 s.o.) indicating equality. These last
comparisons occurred either before 1961 (2 plus 1 s.o.) or in
1969-1970 (in 4 comparisons). The pro-U.S."and "S.U:' comparisons
followed a cyclic pattern of superiority. The Soviets (as one
would expect) overwhelmingly dominated in the Sputnik and "missile-gap"
years of 1957 through 1960. The U.S. dominated in turn in the
Kennedy-MacNamara strategic buildup years from 1962 through 1969.
The Soviets then dominated again (1970-1974) when their own buildup
was making itself felt.
Nine favorable U.S. comparisons were strictly quantitative, as
were 3 favoring the Soviet Union and 3 indicating equality.
Justifications
Other than in strictly quantitative comparisons,justifications
were presented in 16 articles or c.i.'s. On six occasions (all
from 1957 through 1960),"pro-Soviet"comparisons were justified by
referring to demonstrated Soviet satellite or missile successes.
In two of these cases, Soviet successes were specifically contrasted
with U.S. problems or failures. Soviet superiority in rocket
motors, fuels, thrust, and the like also entered into some of the
preceding and in two other justifications (1959'and 1965). One
author reasoned that the Soviets were "outclassing" the U.S. in
missile developments (1971).
A variety of reasons justified "pro-American" references. In a
split-opinion in 1960 the U.S. was viewed as possibly ahead in
missiles-in-general because of its superiority in mobile, relatively
invulnerable, submarine-launched Polaris missiles. In 1965 it was
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perceived as ahead because it was widely deploying the Minuteman
viewed by the DN author as the world's most advanced ICBM. On
two occasions (1965 and 1966) DN authors attributed both qualitative
and quantitative superiority to the U.S. and justified the latter
by noting that the U.S., with hardened sites an'. the like, better
protected its missiles for second strike than did the Soviets.
Though he rated the Soviets as quantitatively superior, one author
in a 1973 split opinion rated the U.S. as qualitatively superior
due to its MIRV capability.
There were few justifications of equality comparisons. One
author made the interesting argument in 1956 that one should assume
that the Soviets have the same or comparable systems and capabilities
as the U.S. and that one should not, as had been done in the past,
underestimate the Soviets. That U.S. qualitative superiority served
to cancel out the Soviet quantitative superiority was reason enough
for a 1969 author to rate both sides as equal.
Sources of Information
Sources affiliated with the U.S. Government appeared in 9 articles
or c.1.'s:
- Senator Symington and Admiral Rickover (1958)
- A U.S. General Philips (1959)
- General Curtiss Lemay (1959)
- "recent statements by high U.S. officials" (1968)
- Secretary MacNamara (1968)
- The Secretary of Defense's Annual Report (1969)
- Secretary Laird (1969)
- The Defense Department (1971)
- The JCS Chairman's Annual Report (1973)
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Non-governmental yearly reviews of military affairs were
mentioned four times:
- Military Balance (once in 1968 and once in 1971)
- Aerospace International's Yearly Review (1970)
- the 1969-1970 SIPRI Yearbook
The remaining sources occurred once or twice:
- general references to the American press or T.V. (once
in 1958 and once in 1959) and a reference pecifically
to a Joseph Alsop column (1959)
- Aviation Week (once in 1958 and once in 1962)
- U.S. News and World Report (1963)
- Asher Lee, indentified as a noted authority in missile
affairs (1959).
Triggering Events
Triggering events fall into a number of groups. One encompasses
U.S. or Soviet missile achievements:
- Sputnik launchings (once each in 1957 and 1958)
- successful Soviet missile shot coincident with the
Berlin crisis (1959)
- U.S. Polaris developments (four times in 1960)
- U.S. and Soviet ICBM developments in the last year (1966).
A second consists of statements, announcements, or policy
decisions by high-level U.S. or Soviet officials and budget sub-
missions in the U.S.:
- Soviet announcements and boasts of their missile power
at the time of the Berlin crisis (occurred twice in 1959
with one occurrence tied to the successful Soviet
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missile shot mentioned above)
- statements by high U.S. officials that the U.S.
is falling behind militarily (1968)
- MacNamara's budget submission to the Congress (1968)
- statement by Secretary Laird on the Soviet nuclear
threat (1969)
- announcement of U.S. decision to install the
Safeguard system (1971)
- announcement and budget submission relative to
Secretary Schlesinger's targetting doctrine (occurred
twice in 1974)
A third group deals with the publication of the following
books or monographs:
- Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy and Robert Osgood's Limited War (both triggered
the same comparison in 1958)
- current issues of Military Balance (1968 and 1970)
- the U.S. Secretary of Defense's Annual Report
(1969)
- Aerospace International's Yearly Review (1970)
- the 1969-70 SIPRI Yearbook Z19711
A fourth group involves SALT, MBFR, and CSCE events. SALT was
mentioned alone in 1970, and all three were mentioned together once
in 1973 and once again in 1974.
Of the remaining events, two concerned French decision-making
on their nuclear rocket program (1958 and 1965), and one concerned
a NATO study then in progress of the nuclear and missile balances.
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Recommendations
Seven authors made recommendations, and of these three en-
couraged France to develop her. own nuclear missiles. Two offered
this recommendation in connection with viewing the Soviets ahead
(once in 1957 and once in 1958), and one did so in connection with
viewing the U.S. ahead quantitatively but the Soviets ahead in
the size and power of individual missiles. Other authors
favoring the Soviets also called upon: (1) the West to maintain
an effective deterrent while increasing flexible response
capability (1959); (2) the West and France to react to the Soviets'
taking advantage of their rocket successes to impress the Third
World (1960); and (3) the U.S. to move ahead with its Safeguard
ABM program (1971). One author who perceived the U.S. as superior
criticized it for not helping France develop her nuclear deterrent,
and he encouraged his country to continue in its endeavors (1962).
THE SLBM BALANCE
Introduction
There was no difficulty in identifying SLBM comparisons, of
which there were 15 in all. They occurred from 1960 through 1973
with only 4 occurring before 1966. (See Table 4.) Five comparisons
were quantitative only.
Balance Perceptions
In contrast with the ballistic-missile-in-general/ICBM balance,
the U.S. was overwhelmingly perceived as superior and the Soviets no
better than equal (once in 1962 and once in 1969). All strictly
quantitative comparisons favored the U.S.
Justifications
The United States was perceived as superior (once in 1966 and






13 + 1 s.o. favored U.S.
0 favored SjU.
1 + 1 s.o. indicated equality
BREAKDOWN PER FIVE-YEAR PERIOD Number of
Comparisons
1955-1959
1960-1964 3 1 (U.S. or Eq.) 4










1962 1 1 (U.S. or Eq.)a 2
1963 ,,_,









1973 1 .... 1
1974
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Footnotes for Table 4
(a) Journal author ambiguous.
(b) Qualified by saying Soviets were ready to put a Polaris-type
missile into service.
(c) Quantitative comparison of Polaris-type only.
(d) One quantitative only.
(e) Quantitative only. One qualified by saying Soviets would
move ahead by 1974.
I;
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it was the first to develop an SLBM with submerged-launch capability
and/or because its missile had more power and range than Soviet
SLBMs. In 1970 it was rated as superior because it had both more
and better SLBMs - better because they were being fitted with MIRVs.
The Soviets were soen as equal (1968) or possibly so (1962) because
they had or were asst.'ed (in 1962) to be putting into service
missiles comparable to the U.S. Polaris.
Sources of Information
With 3 mentions (1968, 1969, and 1970), the current issue of
Military Balance was the most frequently recurring source of infor-
mation on SLBMs acknowledged by the DN authors. On four occasions
DN authors referred to sources associated with the U.S. Senate
(i.e., a 1968 reference to a Senate report) or with the Defense
Department (i.e., a 1969 reference to the Secretary's Annual Report,
a 1971 reference to the Department in general, and a 1973 reference
to the Annual Report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
Aerospace International's Yearly Review and SIPRI's 1969-1970
Yearbook were the only other acknowledged sources.
Triggering Events
Other than the Senate report and the JCS Chairman's Report, the
publication of each of the sources specified above was an event
which triggered thinking on the balance in each case. Other trig-
gering events were:
- launching of r.S. Polaris boats (1960)
- U.S. ballistic missile submarine developments (19F2)
- the Cuban missile crisis (19621
- the U.S, Defensa Department's proposal to accelerate
production ot nuclear attack submarines (1969)
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- SALT entering a new phase (1971)
- ongoing SALT II, MBFR, and CSCE negotiations (1973).
Recommendations
There were no recommendations specifically associated with the
SLBM balance.
STRATEGIC MISSILES (AGGREGATE):
FREQUENCY AND BALANCE PERCEPTIONS
Table 5 aggregates the frequency and balance perceptions data
contained in Tables 3 and 4. In light of SALT I, it is very
surprising that there were more strategic missile references in
1965 through 1969 than in 1970 through 1974. Also within the
'70 - '74 period there was a definite decrease in concern (as
measured by comparisons) since 11 comparisons were made in 1970 and
1971 but only 4 from 1972 through 1974.
The net effect of the Soviets leading in the strategic missiles-
in-general and land-based ICMBs and the U.S. leading in SLBMs is
that each was viewed as superior in a nearly equal number of instances
when one aggregates these sub-categories. However, when one
contrasts the totals in the third five-year period with those of
the fourth one sees that recent trends definitely benefit the
Soviets. There was a sharp increase in "pro-S.U." compariso,,s while







24 + 4 s.o. favored U.S.
22 + 2 s.o. favored S.U.
7 + 2 s.o. indicated equality
BREAKDOWN PER FIVE-YEAR PERIOD Number of
U.S. .U. Split Opinions Comparisons
1955-1959 1 i0 2 12
1960-1964 5 5 9 (TT_- n- -q 12
1965-1969 13 1 1 (U.S. + s.U. 18





1958 5 1 6
1959 4 4
1960 2 5 1 (U.S. or P._ 8
1961
1962 2 1 (U.S. or EQ.) 3
1963 1 _
1964
1965 3 1 (U.S. + S.U.) 4
1966 3
1967 ,,,
1968 3 1 --- A
1969 4 3 7
1970 2 1 2 __ _
1971 3 3 _
1972




THE BALLISTIC-MISSILE SUBMARINE BALANCE
Introduction
This balance includes all statements as to which side had
more and/or better boats and all statements comparing the progress
Each side was making in its boat development and production pro-
grams. Comparisons were easily identified.
There were 21 comparisons spread throughout the years from
1958 on (see Table 6) with no strong concentration in any year
or group of years. Five comparisons were strictly quantitative
as were the "S.U." portions of the 3 split opinions.
Balance Perceptions
This was a strong balance for the U.S. since it received
a significantly larger number of favorable comparisons (14 and
3 s.o.) than did the Soviet Union (3 and 3 s.o.). Six of the
favorable American references (including the "U.S." portions
of the 3 s.c.'s) focused only on technical-qualitative features
of the submarines. Two were quantitative comparisons of Polaris-
types only. Five "pro-S.U." comparisons (including the "S.U."
portion of the 3 s.o.'s) were quantitative only. At no time
(except possibly in 1958) were Soviet nuclear-powered boats ever
seen as superior to those of the U.S. in a technical-qualitative
sense.* This qualitative superiority may partially explain why
the Soviets did not do better even in those years (the edrly
sixties) when they had quantitative superiority in ballistic







14 + 3 s.o. favored U.S.
3 + 3 s.o. favored S.U.
1 indicated equality
BREAKDOWN PER FIVE-YEAR PERIOD Number of
Split 02inion Comarisons
1955-1959 2 1
1960-1964 4 1 (U.S. + gri. 5
1965-1969 5 1 1 (U.S. + S.1.) 8









1962 ia 1 (U.S. + S.U.)b 2
1963
1964 lc 1




1969 2g  ih  3
1970 1l __ 1
1971




Footnotes for Table 6
(a) Comparison restricted to stating Soviets did not have
submerged launch capability the U.S. had.
(b) U.S. viewed ahead qualitatively and S.U. quantitatively.
(c) Comparison restricted to technical quality of submarines.
(d) Ditto previous footnote.
(e) Ditto footnote (b) above.
(f) Quantitative comparison only.
(g) One is a strictly quantitative comparison of nuclear-powered
ballistic missile boats. It was qualified by saying S.U.
might equal U.S. around 1975.
(h) Quantitative comparison of diesel-powered ballistic missile
boats.
(i) Comparison of Polaris-type boats only.
(j) Quantitative comparison of Polaris-type only. Qualified
by saying Soviets expected to reach equality by 1974.
(k) Dittm footnote (b) above.
(1) Comparison of Polaris-type only. Qualified by saying the
Soviets might reach equality soon.
(m) Quantitative comparison only. Qualified by saying that




missile boats overall. Thedpro-Soviet'comparison in 1974, a
year when the U.S. received no favorable mentions, may signal
the beginning of a trend favoring the U.S.S.R. because at about
that time it achieved quantitative superiority in boats roughly
comparable to PArican boats in quality. One can hypothesize
this trend will continue until the U.S. Trident system becomes
operational. The one equality comparison (1968) was quantitative
only.
Justifications
The following reasons justified viewing the U.S. as ahead:
-U.S. boats can fire a missile when submerged while
Soviet submarines cannot. (Once in 1959 and twice in 1962)
-U.S. boats carry more and/or better missiles, including
missiles capable of longer ranges. (Twice in 1962, once
in 1965, and twice in 1966)
-The U.S. produced nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines before the Soviets did. (1959)
-U.S. boats are relatively large and all are nuclear-
powered while Soviet boats are smaller and the majority
are diesel-powered. (1964)
The pro-Soviet comparison in 1958 was the only one favorable to the USSR
(including s.o.'s), which was not strictly quantitative. The
DN author emphasized in that instance the Soviets already had
ballistic missile boats operational while the U.S. was not
expected to have them for two years. As already noted, the
one equality comparison was quantitative only.
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Sources of Information
Among acknowledged sources of information, the current
issue of Flottes de Combat was mentioned three times (1960, V
1968 and 1972) and the following once each:
-Asher Lee, a "noted authority" (1959)
-The Atlantic Council Standing Group Report (1962)
-The U.S. Defense Department, U.S. Congress budget data,
and Jane's Fighting Ships (all mentioned together in 1962)
-Numerous official notices, end-of-the-year articles in
specialized French and foreign journals and especially
publication of the 1968 naval annuals (all mentioned
together in 1968)
-A statement of Secretary of Defense Laird (1969)
-The current issue of Military Balance (1969)
-The International Institute of Strategic Studies (1970)
-The Annual Report of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (19731
Triggering Events
Publication of some of the above sources prominently
figured as triggering events. These included the three Flottes
de Combat refezences, the Atlantic Council Standing Group Report,
the "numerous official notices, end-of-the-year articles...,"
the Laird statement, and Military Balance. There were, in
addition, seven other triggering events, and it will suffice
to merely list them here:
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-Soviet rocket developments (1958)
-Khrushchev's boast about Soviet military superiority
at the Berlin crisis (1959)
-Recent U.S. and Soviet progress in missiles (1959)
-U.S. ballistic missile boat developments (1962)
-Opening of the Helsinki SALT (1970)
-Ongoing SALT 1I, MBFR, and CSCE negotiations (1973)
-Announcement of Secretary Schlesinger's targeting
doctrine (3974)
Recommendations
One recommendation was made. In a 1972 comparison where
the author viewed the U.S. as ahead quantitatively, but with
the Soviets approaching equality, the author recommended against
the U.S. building more submarines simply to stay ahead of the
U.S.S.R. He recommended that the U.S. concentrate instead on





Included in this category are references comparing which
side had more and/or better bombers in general, more and/or
better strategic bombers in particular, better strategic aviation
capability, or a better bomber or strategic aviation development
program. Of primary concern were references to heavy or long-
range bombers or bombers which could leave one side's honeland,
strike the other's, and return. As already indicated, no attempt
was made to control whether a DN author's reference to "strategic
bombers" or "bombers in general" was meant to include medium
bombers, light bombers, or forward-based tactical aircraft.*
There were 21 comparisons (see Table 7), 7 in 1957 through
1960, and 14 in 1965 through 1973. The latter 14 reveal that,
even in the age of missiles, DN concern for or awareness of
the strategic aviation balance--as measured by comparisons--has
not, with the exception of the 1961 through 1964 period, dimin-
ished over time. Four comparisons were quantitative only.
Balance PerceptionL
Not surprisingly the U.S. was viewed as ahead in all com-
parisons except one (a 1957 equality reference). It is ironic
that the DN author in that instance qualified 'is conclusion by
noting that if the Soviets were behind, they would su-:ely
catch up--a prediction not borne out by his colleagues in later
comparisons. The four strictly quantitative comparisons were
all pro-U.S.









BREAKDOWN PER'FIVE-YEAR PERIOD Number of








1957 1 la 2
1958 1 1-
1959 3b 3














1973. 3 - 3
1974 1_
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Footnotes for Table 7
(a) Qualified by saying that, if the Soviets were behind,
there was no reason to believe they would not catch up
quickly.
(b) One comparison qualified by saying Soviet long-range
bimber hardware might be equal to the U.S. if the Soviet
Bounder was as good as the author believed it to be.
(c) Quantitative only.
(d) One comparison quantitative only. A second comparison
qualified by saying Soviet tactical aviation could reach
all the interesting objectives in the world close to
Europe. A third comparison qualified by mentioning
Soviet lead in medium bombers.
(e) Quantitative comparison only.
(f) One comparison quantitative only. One comparison quali-
fied by saying Soviet medium bombers and the Soviet
Backfire aircraft could hit the U.S. on a one-way trip.
The second comparison qualified by saying that the
Backfire was being put into service.
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Justifications
The reasoning underlying the equality comparison is presented
directly above. That the U.S. was both quantitatively and qual-
itatively superior entered into 6 justifications (1959, twice in
1965, 1966, 1969, and 1970). The qualitative portion of those
justifications included assertions about U.S. superiority in
equipment, training (additionally mentioned in a second 1959
justification), capability to penetrate an enemy's homeland
(also mentioned in a 1958 comparison), in-flight refueling,
range, readiness, and payload. U.S. possession of forward bases
was cited in a 1959 justification.
Sources of Information
The current issue of Military Balance was acknowledged
threc times (1965, 1969, and 1970) and the U.S. Secretary of
Defense's Annual Repovt twice (1969 and 1973) - the latter being
mencioned with the Annual Report of the JCS Chairman. Other
sources were:
-Aviation Week, Air Force, and "other specialized
American reviews" (1957)
-Gen Power, SAC Commander (1959)
-Asher Lee, a "noted authority" (1959)
-Aerospace International's Yearly Review (19701
-The 1969-1970 SIPRI Yearbook
Triggering Events
Publication of the reports, reviews, magazines, and year-
books mentioned above all served to trigger thinking. The
reference to Aviation Week, Air Force and other specialized
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American reviews all relate to what they had to say about 11e
Soviet Tushino Air Show and the related visit of the U.S. Air
Force Chief of Staff, General Twining, to the U.S.S.R. The
remaining triggering events include:
-Soviet successes in ICBMs and satellites (1957)
-The Kremlin's boast of military superiority at
the time of the Berlin crisis (1959)
-U.S. and Soviet aeronautic developments and related
Soviet claims (1959)
-The French decision to concentrate on ballistic
missiles vice bombers (1965)
-U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear developments in
the last year (1966)
-Opening of SALT (1970)
-Ongoing CSCE, MBFR, and SALT :! negct.ations
Recommendatior.&
This writer did not find any recommezdations made which
flowed logically and directly fror b'mb-2r conarisons. Many
of these comparisons occurred as suD-bdlancem in articles or
c.i.'s where the author was inquiriqy int, a larger, overall
balance. What recommendations were made seemed more logically





THE CONVENTIONAL OR GROUND FORCES BALANCE
Introduction
This category aggregates together references to the general
or overall conventional forces balance and to the general or
overall ground forces balance. They were aggregated because
some authors clearly referred to one or the other's superiority
in "conventional," "classical," or "traditional" forces but then
restricted discussion to ground forces.* Based or, the fact that
Table 8 shows only 6 comparisons, it would seem that there was
little concern for this balance in a U.S.-S.U. context, particu-
larly after 1963 since there were no comparisons after that year.
Balance Perceptions
The Soviets unqualifiedly dominated in all six cases.
Justifications
Two authors provided justifications. A 1956 author, noting
that "armies that focus too much on luxuries seldom win wars,"
declared that there were "too many elements weighing down the
mobility of the U.S. Army and maybe too much luxury." A 1958
author elaborated by pointing out that the Soviets were not, in
contrast to the U.S., building up their nuclear strength at the
expense of their conventional forces. That author saw the U.S.
as possibly having to escalate any conflict up to total war in
order to avoid defeat while the Soviets retained the capability
to fight the whole gamut of wars.
*Comparisons specifically addressing the conventional naval or air
balances are dealt with in the next two chapters respectively.
Comparisons restricted to Zocuqing on personnel numbers or on nub-
categories of the ground forces balance (e.g., tank references)
are dealt with in Appendix V.
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-The introduction by the Soviets of various types of new
conventional arms in their inventory (1958).
-Khrushchev offer of disarmament proposals (1960).
-The meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister
MacMillan in the Bahamas whereby they agreed to offer the
Polaris system to France (1963).
Recommendations
There were four recommendations, three of which can clearly
be viewed as encouraging greater flexible response capability:
-The U.S. should cease building up its strategic nuclear
forces at the expense of its conventional forces. It
should retain the capability to fight wars at all levels
without the need for escalation to total war (1958).
-The West should be skeptical of any disarmament proposals
that involve the reduction of U.S. or NATO troops in
Europe. Reductions would only favor the Soviets (1960).
-The West must insure it has the capability to respond
to any Soviet military initiatives. In order to prevent
war, the West must make clear its determination to
respond to any initiatives (1961).
-The U.S. and its allies must increase their flexible
response capabilities (1963).
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The Question of Context
It was particularly in the N/W-S/S context that the problem
arose of knowing whether an author intended to have his reference
to conventional or classical forces apply only to ground forces.
Most N/W-S/S comparisons seemed restricted to the European theater,
though at times an author may have intended his reference to have
wider scope. Because ambiguities were too often unresolvable,
no differentiations in that regard were made in coding.
The significance of the data contained in Table 9 needs little
elaboration. DN authors overwhelmingly viewed the conventional
or ground forces balance in N/W-S/S vice U.S.-S.U. terms. Though
significantly less marked than in the U.S.-S.U. comparisons, there
was, as in those comparisons, less concern about this balance in the
second decade than in the first. The Soviets were unanimously
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Footnotes for Table 9
(a) One reference qualified by saying that Soviet conventional
superiority could be neutralized by Western use of nuclear
weapons, by the presence of hostile satellite states in
the Soviet camp, and by Soviet inability in war to secure
their interior and exterior lines of communications.
(b) One reference qualified by noting that in some ways large





This category includes all statements focusing on which
Navy is superior overall as well as all references restricted,
to comparing which had more ships or tonnage, technically
better ships, or better ship development programs.* There were
29 comparisons. (See Table 10) Two focused only on the tech-
nical-qualitative features of each side's ships and two only
on tonnage.
The distribution of the comparisons (19 in the first
decade and 10 in the second) is not consistent with this
writer's expectations for two reasons. First, the Soviets
very impressively increased the quality of their naval inventory
in the last ten years and increased inventory quantitites in
some very important areas (e.g., nuclear-powered submarines
and major surfac,. combatants). Second, since 1964 and most
especially since 1967,they stepped up their long-range deploy-
ments and, thereby, their "visibility" on the world's oceans.
While such activities did not go unnoticed by DN authors,
they did not occasion the number of second decade comparisons
which this writer expected.** The fact that all second-decade
comparisons occurred in 1967 and beyond, and that their number
77Comparisons restricted to sub-categories of the naval balance
(e.g., cruisers, destroyers, etc.) are dealt with in Appendix VI,
**An obvious implication is that focusing on comparisons may not be
the best way to measure "concern for" or "awareness of" factors
which may significantly affect a balance.
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Table 10
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1958 1ic  4
1959 2 a 2
1960 1e 1
1961 2f  -
1962 39 -3
1963 1 1





1969 2j  2
1970





Footnotes for Table 10
(a) One reference was a comparison of technical-qualitative
aspects only. All comparisons noted that the Soviets
had made very significant progress in naval development.
(b) One reference restricted to technical-qualitative aspects
only.
(c) Qualified by saying U.S. superior if one were to restrict
comparison to surface ship confrontation at sea.
(d) One reference restricted to comparison of tonnages only.
Qualified by saying Soviets had in recent years (since
1953) outproduced U.S. in tonnage. Second comparison
noted that Soviets had made very significant progress in
naval developments.
(e) Qualified by saying Soviets had made very significant
progress in recent years.
(f) One comparison qualified as in (e) above.
(g) All comparisons qualified as in (e) above.
(h) One comparison qualified as in (e) above. Second com-
parison qualified by stressing the great threat posed
by the Soviet submarine force.
i) Qualified as in (e) above.
(j) One reference comparison of tonnage only. Both qualified
as in (e) above.
(k) Comparison qualified as in (e) above with additional
thought that Soviets are qualitatively superior
"in certain areas."
(l) Comparison qualified as in (e) above.
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increased slightly over time thereafter may, from a comparisons
point of view, indicate at least a weak trend of increasing
concern for the balance.
Balance Perceptions
It is clear that the U.S. dominated in this balance area
though a majority of the "pro-U.S." writers readily acknowledged
Soviet progress in building up their navy.* It may be significant
--reflecting the reasons mentioned above--that the U.S. did most
poorly in the last five years. Of six comparisons, it was seen
as superior in only 3 and equal in the remainder. Two of the
latter occurred in 1974, the only year where the U.S. was not
seen as superior in a year where comparisons were made. Extrapo-
lating from these data,one can hypothesize a trend away from
perceiving the U.S. as superior.
Justifications
In justification of their views that the U.S. was ahead,
DN authors presented the following reasons--many of which were
linked together in the same article or c.i.:
-U.S. superiority in tonnage and/or in ship numbers,
particularly the former. (9 comparisons with 8 occur-
ing between 1957 and 1964 and one in 1969.)
*They also frequently acknowledged Soviet superiority in submarines-
in-general. See Appendix VI where of 15 submarines-in-general coin-
parisons, the USSR was rated superior in 13 (including one s.o.1
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-The U.S. Navy's status as a better balanced Navy, particu-
larly due to the number of its aircraft carriers and
major surface combatants (7 justifications with 6 occurring
between 1956 and 1962 and one in 1972).*
-The U.S. Navy being a navy with ships of "revolutionary"
or "modern" design in contrast to the more "classical"
Soviet Navy (once each in 1956 and 1960 and twice in 1962).**
-The U.S. Navy's superiority in logistics and in capability
to roam all the oceans of the world (twice in 1962, once
each in 1972 and 1973).
-The U.S. Navy's superiority in equipment and armament
(once each in 1954 and 1964).
-General U.S. superiority in open-ocean sea-control
capability (once in 1962).
-The superiority of U.S. aircraft carriers compared to
Soviet missile ships (once in 1962).
-U.S. superiority in amphibious capability (1962).
-U.S. superiority in training (1964).
-The constraints on Soviet naval operations due to problems
of geography and weather (1962).
The only reason given for justifying an equality comparison
(in 1974) was that the Soviets had, through slow but steady
progress, finally caught up with the U.S.
* That nearly all occurred in 1962 or before is consistent with
the point made earlier that the Soviets after 1962 increased the
number of major surface combatants in their inventory.
**That all occurred before 1963 is consistent with point alluded
to earlier that the Soviets (particularly in the last ten years)
produced ships of significantly increased technical sophistication
compared to what they had built earlier.
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Sources of Information
Five sources of information were acknowledged. Flottes de
Combat appeared twice (1960 and 1972), and Admiral Barjot, the
NATO Bulletin, and the 1969-70 Military Balance each appeared
once (1959, 1962, and 1969 respectively).
Triggering Events
The publication of Flottes de Combat ane of Military
Balance as mentioned above accounted for three triggering events.
The following were acknowledged in nine other instances:
-controversy surrounding Field Marshal Montgomery's ideas
about strategy in the nuclear age (1956).
-American ship and submarine building developments (1961).
-Soviet inroads into the Third World (1962).
-The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).
-The Thresher sinking (1964).
-The decision of the French government to pull out of
NATO's military structure (1967).
-Disengagement of U.S. forces from Vietnam (1973).
-Manifestations of detente such as the signing of various
U.S.-Soviet Union accords in 1972 and 1973 and ongoing
MBFR talks (1974).
Recommendations
Five U.S.-Soviet Union comparisons were accompanied by
recommendations. All except the last (an equality comparison)
were made in conjunction with viewing the U.S. ahead:
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-The U.S. and the West should maintain flexible naval
forces ready to respond to any contingency around the
world (1956).
-NATO should do whatever 13 necessary to insure sea
control of the Atlantic ti958).
-The West should enter into psychological warfare for
Third World minds. The U.S. Navy has not been properly
utilized in this regard. (1962).
-The West should not underestimate Soviet naval growth
and the potential it gives the Soviets for influencing
the West. (1969)
-France should build up her naval forces to protect
her interests. (1971)
The Question of Context
Comparing the U.S.-Soviet Union data with N/W-S/S data
(See Table ll ) indicates that the naval balance is most often
seen in '.S.-Soviet Union terms. The N/W side, as one migait
have hypothesized, dominated the category. Again the number
of comparisons in the last few years seems low.
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Table 11
NAVAL BALANCE (N/W vs SIE)
BALANCE PERCEPTIONS
Of 9 comparisons
7 + 1 s.o. favored N/W
1 favored S/S
1 S.o. indicated equality
BREAKDOWN PER FIVE-YEAR PERIOD Number of
w Sf Split Opinions Comparisons
1955-1959 3 __
1960-1964 1 1 (N/W or Ea)

























(a) Comparison restricted to evaluating Western sea control capability
versus Soviet sea denial capability.
(bl Ditto footnote (a).






Coded under this category were statements to the effect
that one or the other side had more air power, more and/or
better aircraft overall, or a better aircraft development pro-
gram.* The number of comparisons (4) was small and suggests
that the air balance in general was not a matter of great concern
to DN authors. As seen in Table 12, three occurred in 1957 and
one in 1974. Specifically why three of the four should occur
in 1957 is difficult to establish. Triggering events may be
part of the explanation. One was the visit of the USAF Chief of
Staff, General Nathan Twining, to the U.S.S.R. in conjunction
with the Tushino Air Show. A second was the Paris Air Show
at Le Bourget Field. Both events elicited extensive articles.
All the 1957 comparisons were made before the f~rst successful
ICBM shot (by the U.S.S.R.) in August, suggesting that the
advent of the age of long-range missiles may have contributed
to drawing attention away from the overall air balance.**Indeed
even the number of air sub-balance references made by DN authors
(see Appendix V ) would have been small if not for three
articles/c.i.'s (in 1969, 1970, and 1972) where the authors
took occasion of the publication of the current issue of
Military Balance to review the state of the balances covered
therein.
*Comparisons restricted to sub-categories of the air balance (e.g.,
fighters) are dealt with in Appendix VII except for strateqic bombers
strategic aviation. These were dealt with in Cnapter VI.
**The same phenomenon, however, did not occur with the strategic
aviation balance. See above, p. 57.
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Table 12
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(a) One comparison restricted to technical-qualitative features of super-
power aircraft. A second comparison saw the U.S. as only "slightly .head"
with the Soviets, though, possibly exhausting themselves.
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Balance Perceptions
There were 3 "pro-U.S." comparisons and 1 equality reference.
One 1957 comparison was restricted to the qualitative-technical
features of aircraft.
Justifications
Justifications occurred twice--both in 1957. One author
supported his views with a detailed review of irdividual sub-
balances. Another author said that the complex and sophisticated
system seen on the B-52 at the Paris Air Show proved the U.S.
to be superior to all rivals in aircraft technology.
Sources of Information
The only acknowledged sources were Aviation Week, Air
Force, and other specialized American reviews reporting on
General Twining's visits to the U.S.S.R. and the Tushino Air
Show.
Triggering Events
Two events have already been mentioned in the Introduction.
In addition, "manifestations of detente" (such as the signing of
various U.S.-Soviet agreements in 1972 and 1973) triggered the
1974 comparison.
Recommendations
No recommendations were specifically associated with the
overall air balance comparisons.
The Question of Context
With only two comparisons, the number of N/W-S/S references
was even smaller than the number for the U.S. versus the Soviets.
Both occurred in 1957, one in the same article as a U.S.-S.U.
comparison dealt with above. In that article NATO aerial forcs
J4
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were seen as qualitatively superior in a comparison which had
Eastern bloc (including Chinese) aerial forces otherwise enjoying
a "certain equilibrium." It was not stated whether the latter 1
equilibrium was specifically quantitative in nature. The second I
1957 comparison rated both sides equal and seemed restricted to
the European theater only.
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Table 13
AIR BALANCE (N/W vs S/S)
BALANCE PERCEPTIONS
Of 2 comparisons
1 S.o. favored N/W
0 favored S/S
1+ s.o. indicated equality
BREAKDOWN PER FIVE-YEAR PERIOD Number of
N/W S/S Split Opinions Comparisons
1955-1959 1 1 (N/W + ES) 2
1960-1964






















(a) N/W seen as qualitatively superior. Balance was viewed as otherwise









Balances in Order of Frequency
And Related Trends
Table 14 lists the balances in order of frequency. It also
highlights recent frequency trends associated with each balance
as derived by comparing the number of references in 1965-69 with
the number in 1970-74.
Based on the number of comparisons, the strategic nuclear
balance far and away loomed most often in the minds of DN authors.
In line with this frequency is the relatively high number of
strategic missile (aggregate) references. Of the conventional
balances, the naval wes the most significant while the air and
conventional or ground forces balances received the smallest
amount of attent! Dn. Frequency trends do not indicate any major
or radical shifts in the 1965-69 vice 1970-74 periods.
U.S.-S.U. Balance Comparisons
In N/W-S/S Context
Fcr the conventional balances, references were coded for
N/W-S/S as well as U.S.-S.U. comparisons. Comparisons for overall
totals for each are contained in Table 15. The numbers clearly
indicate that the conventional or ground forces balance is--not
surprisingly--most often seen in N/W-S/S terms while the naval
balance is not. The general air balance totals are too small for any
valid conclusions.
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Table 1 4 a
BALANCE AREAS IN ORDER OF FREQUENCY
Number of
Comparisons Trend
Balance (1955-1974) (1965-69 vs. 1970-74)
(1) Strategic nuclear balance 201 No significant change
(From 55 to 57 comparisons)
(2) Strategic ballistic 57 Small decrease
missiles (aggregate) (From 18 to 15)
(3) Strategic-missiles-in- 42 Decrease (From 13 to 9)
general and land based
ICBMs
(4) Naval-in-general 29 Slight increase
(From 4 to 6)
(5) Strategic nuclear bombs 22 No change (From 7 to 7)
and warheads
Ballistic-missile submarines 21 Small decrease
(From 8 to 5)(6)
Strategic bombers/strategic 21 No change (From 7 to 7)
aviation
(7) SLBMs 15 Very slight increase
(From 5 to 6)
(8) Conventional or ground 6 No change (From 0 to 0)
forces-in-general
,9) Air-in-general 4 Very slight increase
(From 0 to 1)
(a) If the general military power and war-winning cardbility balance
as dealt with in Appendix II were included in this Table, it would be
in fourth place with 30 comparisons.
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Table 15
CONVENTIONAL BALANCES IN U.S.-S.U. AND N/W-S/S CONTEXT
Number Of:
u. .-5. U. NIW-51
Balance :omparisons Comparisons





Table 16 summarizes the data on balance perceptions ovier the
20 year period and for the 1965-69 and 1970-74 periods. Data for
the latter two periods are useful for stating conclusions about
more recent trends as contained in those periods. From the Table,
it seems clear that the U.S. dominated in the following areas over
the 20 years:





The U.S. also led in the air balance category but the significance
of its lead is questionable since the number totals are so small.
As for the Soviets, they led in two areas:
-strategic missiles-in-general and land based ICBMs
-conventional or ground forces
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BALANCE PERCEPTIONS AND RELATED TRENDS
U.S. Dominated Balancesa
"Pro-U.S." areas/20 year trend Trend for last two
five-year periods
1. Strategic nuclear bombs 1. No significant change
and warheads
2. SLBMs 2. Increased perceptions
of U.S. superiority
3. Ballistic missile submarines 3. No significant change
4. Strategic bombers/strategic 4. No significant change
aviation.




aAir balance not included due to small number of com-arisons
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Table 18
BLANCE PERCEPTIONS AND RELATED TRENDS
U.S.S.R. Dominatod Balances
"Pro-U.S.S.R." Areas/ Trend in last two five-
20-Year Trend year periods
1. Strategic missiles-in- 1. Increased perceptions of
general/ICBMs Soviet superiority
(with decrease in per-
ceptions of U.S. superior-
ity)
2. Conventional or ground forces 2. No significant change
Table 19
BALANCE PERCEPTIONS AND RELATED TRENDS
Superpower Equality/Stalemate
Equlty/stalemate areas Trend in last two five-
20-year trend year periods
1. Strategic nuclear 1. Increased perceptions of
equality (with accompan-
ying decrease in percep-
tions of U.S. superiority)
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The two superpowers can essentially be regarded, from a perceptions
viewpoint, as either equal or in a stalemate situation in two balances:
-strategic nuclear balance
-strategic missiles (aggregate).
They can be regarded as equal in the first because of the prepolderant
number of equality comparisons and in stalemate in the second be-
cause both were viewed as ahead in a nearly equal number of cases
(24 + 4 s.o. versus 22 + 2 s.o.).
Comparing the data for the last two five-year periods results
in the following more recent trends in balance perceptions:
-increased perceptions of U.S. superiority in SLBMs
-Increased perceptions of Soviet superiority in:
(1) Strategic missiles (aggregate) (with accompanying
decrease in perceptions of U.S. superiority)
(2) Strategic missiles-in-general and land-based ICBMs
(with accompanying decrease in perceptions of U.S.
superiority)
-Increased perceptions of equality in:
(1) The strategic nuclear balance (with accompanying
decrease in perccption of U.S. superiority)
(2) The naval balancs (with accompanying decrease in
perceptions of U.S. superiority)
-No significant change in perceptions relative to:
(1) Strategic nuclear bombs and warheads
(2) Ballistic missile submarines
(3) Strategic bombers/strategic aviation
(4) Conventional or ground forces
(5) Air power-in-general
It is worth noting that the four instances of increased perceptions
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of Soviet superiority and increased perceptions of equality were
all accompanied by corresponding decreases in perceptions of U.S.
superiority.
Tables 17, 18, and 19 link together 20 year trends with the
more recent trends derived by comparing totals of the last two
five-year periods. As seen therein, the U.S. lead in its 5 areas
over the 20 years (not counting the air balance) was accompanied
by more recent trends of no significant change in 3 (strategic
nuclear bombs and warheads, ballistic missile submarines,
strategic bombers/st:ategic aviation), increased perceptions of
U.S. superiority in 1 (SLBMs), and increased perceptions toward
equality in the last (naval power-in-general). There was no
significant change in one df the Soviet dominated balances
(conventional or ground forces) and increased perceptions of
Soviet superiority (accompanied by a decrease in perceptions of U.S.
suaperiority) in the other (strategic missiles-in-general/ICBMs).
The equality and stalemate balance areas were characterized by
increased perceptions of equality in the former (strategic nuclear
balance) and increased perceptions of Soviet superiority in the
latter (strategic missiles (aggregate)). Decreases in perceptions
of U.S. superiority were involved with both trends.
Balance Perceptions in N/W-S/S Context
Table 20 summarizes the U.S.-S.U. and N/W-S/S perceptions
for the conventional balances. N/W-S/S twenty-year trends for
the conventional or ground forces balance match the U.S.-S.U.
trends. There were no significant changes in trends for both
contexts when comparing the last two f:.ve-year periods, but it
must be pointed out that the reason for no change in the U.S.-S.U.
balance is that there were simply no comparisons in either period.
N/W-S/S twenty-year trends for the naval balance also
92
matched U.S.-S.U. trends, but the more recent trends did not match
since the U.S.-S.U. balance moved toward equality while the N/W-S/S
balance did not. The N/W-S/S numbers, however, were very small,
and, hence, of possibly questionable significance. Air balance
totals are too few to allow for valid generalizations.
Justifications
Justifications were too varied, multi-faceted, and tied to
individual balance areas to allow for general conclusions here.
Sources of Information
Of all sources, the ones acknowledged most frequently were
those associated with the U.S. Government's executive or legis-
lative branches (particularly the former). Non-governmental
annuals devoted to military/naval affairs (e.g., IISS's Military
Balance, Flottes de Combat,etc.) were the second most acknowledged
sources. French Government sources were mentioned in surprisingly
few instances. References to books and periodicals were infrequent
but not as rare as references to newspapers.
Triggering Events
As with justifications, triggering events for each balance
were too varied and multi-faceted to allow for generalizations
here.
Recommendations*
Three recommendations recurred most frequently. One,
associated with the strategic balances, encouraged French or
Dealt with here are only those recommendations which recurred
relatively frequently and had some general applicability by
being made in connection with more than one balance area.
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Western European development of a force de frappe and/or related
delivery systems. It was usually made in connection with equality
references but also occurred with a small number of both "pro-U.S."
and "pro-S.U." comparisons. It was not unusual for this recommen-
dation to be associated (in instances of perceived equality or
Soviet superiority) with the thought that the U.S. could no longer,
due to increases in Soviet strategic power, be counted on to go
to nuclear war in response to Soviet aggression in Europe. It was
also not unusual, regardless of the perceived state of a balance,
tc have this suggeation justified by claims that France must
develop her deterrent either to avoid a superpower condominium
or to assure herself a strong voice in NATO circles.
Recurring almost as frequently were admonitions that the
U.S. and/or the West should increase their flexible response
capabilities. These recommendation occurred especially with
strategic comparisons that had both sides equal. They also arose
with "pro-S.U." 2onventional or ground forces comparisons (3 times)
and "pro-U.S." naval comparisons (once, possibly twice).
Third in frequency and occurring in almost all cases in
connection with strategic balances were suggestions to the effect
that the West must act to counter Soviet politico-psychological
advances in the Third World. These recommendations were made
most often in the late fifties and e~rly sixties when Khrushchev
was strongly wooing the underdeveloped and verbally supporting
"wars of national libcration." They were particularly associated
with the Soviet's reaching equality in the strategic areas
(hence assuxing themselves a modicum of security vis-a-vis the
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U.S.) or with Soviet space activities viewed as particularly
impressive to Third World sta# s.
Other than the strategic nuclear balance, there were no
recommendations that supported arms controls measures 'even with
MBFR), and, surprisingly, only one recommendation that called
upon France, exclusive of the West or the U.S., to build up her
conventional force capabilities (in this case, naval). As already
noted, while many DN authors desired that France/Western Europe
build a nuclear deterrent due to some lack of confidence in the
U.S., there were--again, surprisingly--no recommendations to the
effect that, since one or another balance was shifting in favor
of the U.S.S.R., France/Western Europe should move to build up
political fences with the Soviets. Indeed, recommendations that
the U.S. or Western countries as a group increase their flexible
response capabilities signify willingness to continue working





There are seven recommendations worthy of cansideration.
First: Other perception studies should be undertaken
focusing on different countries and guided by similar questions
as asked herein. These should complement one another, and they
should provide the basis for making widely applicable generali-
zations about perceptions. Based on these generalizations,
policy-makers might then be better able to take into account
the reaction of other countries to U.S.-S.U. military balance
developments.
Second: Some future studies should deal with sources similar
to Defense Nationale but others should focus on different sources
to ascertain the relative utility of each.*
Third: Some future studies should definitely involve experi-
mentation with machine-reading of foreign materials. There should
also be experimentation with computer-coding, -tabulation, and
-correlation of data whether or not it is machine-read. Because
of the press of time, I had to break off my own efforts at
devising a coding scheme suitable for computer-manipulation, but I
am convinced the problem is not insurmountable, especially for
someone more experienced than I in computer programming.
Fourth: Unless materials are to be machine-read, I recommend
that any one future investigator restrict his focus to a smaller
number of balance areas than 1 did. "Jumping" from one balance
area to another was more "disruptive" to my thought processes than
*See Appendix I.
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I would have predicted. Also, the sheer volume of reading, coding,
tabulation, and problem-solving can be handled much more efficiently
the narrower one's focus.
Fifth: It may be that the focus on comparisons per se is too
narrow. Consideration should be given to coding not only balance
comparisons but also, on a thematic basis, everything said about
U.S. or Soviet endeavors in a particulai azea of military concern.
As I have already stated, DN authors did pay attention to the
growth, forward deployment, and foreign-policy use of the Soviet
Navy in the second decade of this study. Yet, they did so while
making a smaller number of naval power-in-general comparisons
during that period.* Focusing just on comparisonb, then, gave the
impression of decreased attention to the naval area, but such was
not really the case.
Sixth: A particularly important problem requiring attention
is how to make a coding process as replicable as possible without
having to adopt a morass of coding rules or rules which force one
to leave out relevant materials. It would be particularly good
in future studies to have at least two investigators work together
reading the same materials independently and consulting on ambiguous
cases. It also would be interesting to have someone attempt to
duplicate what I have done to see to what extent another's coding
replicates mine.
Finally, if time had allowed, I could have done a good deal
more with my data, particularly as regards providing explanations,
making correlations, pointing out policy implications, and ty ng
in the "sub-balance" data contained in the appendixes with the
balance-in-general data presented in the previous chapters. I
*See above, p. 69.
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strongly oelieve efforts should be made in those directions, and
I would be pleased to cooperate with any investigators willing or
assigned to perform such tasks.
!1
| . . . ... .. .. ....
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APPENDIX I
Some Thoughts Relative to Development of a Framework for




Whom should one focus on as indicative of a country's perceptions?
FP-ible choices:




d. Military chiefs, esp. naval
2. Governmental leaders/Legislative Branch
a. Legislative leaders
b. Members of foreign policy/defense committees/sub-
committees
c. Rank and file legirlators
3. Attentive public/public opinion elites
a. Newspaper editors
b. Other commentators on foreign and defense policy
c. Labor, business, church, university leaders
Perceptions of the above can be gauged by having reference to:
1. That country's version of the U.S.'s State Deaxm
Bulletin
2. White papers on foreign or dafense questions
3. That country's version of the yearly U.S. DOD Report
4. Their version of the Congressional Record or Britain's
Hansard/legislative committee or subcommittee reports
5. Position papers of political parties
6. Newspaper editorials
7. Radio or television commentaries as published by FBIS
Preceding page blank
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General questions to ask in probing perceptions could include:
1. At different points in time/over time, how do the
individuals factually assess the U.S.-U.S.S.R. naval
balance?
2. As far as subsets of the overall balance is concerned,
where do they feel the U.S. Navy is strongest vis-a-vis
the U.S.S.R.? Weakest?
3. What effect do they see the state of the balance having
on their country, especially relative to its security?
4. If allied to the U.S., do they express decreased confi-
dence in the U.S. commitments?
5, How do they feel about the answers to questions #1, #2,
#3, and #4 above?
6. What do they say should be done?
a. Work more closely with the U.S.? U.S.S.R.?
b. Work less closely with the U.S.? U.S.S.R.?
c. Adopt a neutral stance?
d. Increase their own naval or cther capability to be
able to act more independently?
7. (Though of a different nature than the above questions,
one might also try to look at what that state has
actually done.)
Content analysis of documents, statements, newspaper editoriaLs
and the like might seek to code the following'information:
1. Number -if individual references to the U.S. Navy/U.S.S.R.
Navy.
2. Number of references to the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Navies
together.
3. Number of favorable references to the U.S./U.S.S.R.
Navy relative to naval balance:
a. overall balance
b. balance as to ability of U.S. or U.S.S.R. Navy to
perform specific missions (e.g., interdiction of
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sea lines of communice on or nuclear deterrence)
against the threat pc ed by the other.
4. Number of references tc working more closely or less
closely with the U.S. or U.S.S.R. in foreign policy/
defense because of the state of the naval balance.
5. Number of references indicating willingness or lack of
willingness to rely on U.S. taval power.
A problem of time exists. Among the "cuts" to be considered
would be:
1. The whole post-war pericd; changes in perception might
occur as the U.S.S.R. Navy enhanced its position relative
to the U.S. Navy.
2. Selected years such as:
-1946 - the first post-war year
-1952 - mid-point between 1946-1958
-1958 - high point year in quantitative buildup of
Soviet naval inventory associated with Stalin
decisions. Also year of Lebanon crisis.
-1963 - year after Cuban missile crisis (allowing time
for reaction to and evaluation of crisis).
-1965 - year after Soviet Navy begins forward deploy-
ment to Med.
-1968 - year after 1967 Mid-East Wax and appearance of
Moskva, Yankee; year of Soviet forward deploy-
ment to Indian Ocean.
-1972 - year after Okean exercise.
-1974 - year after 1973 Mid-East War.














Finally how does one account for the overarc context
within which a country would perceive the U. S.RI naval
balance - specifically the general state of relations between that
third country and the U.S. and U.S.S.R. respectively and its per-
ception of the overall politico-diplomatic, nuclear, and military
balance. If, in its foreign and defense policy, a country seeks
to move "away" from the U.S. to a more neutral stance or to a
stance closer to the Soviet Union, what are the reasons? Where





GENERAL MILITARY POWER OR WAR WINNING CAPABILITY.DATA
Introduction
This category--referred to as the GMP-WWC balance--encompasses
comparisons which deal either with the overall military situation
existing between tha two Great Powers or with the overall capability
of either to prevail in a general war. It does not encompass
comparisons which deal with specific areas of military endeavor
(e.g., strategic missile systems or naval capabilities), nor does
it include D.N. references restricted to comparing which side would
overcome the other in a strategic nuclear exchange or a conventional
military struggle. These are dealt with under other categories.
The following are examples of GMP-WWC references:
-The U.S. is better equipped to obtain its war objectives.
(1957) (Coding noted that comparison restricted to how well
each country was equipped.)
-The dissuasion exercised by the United States is not only
in the nuclear domain but also comes into play each time
an eventual aggressor compares the risks to the gains. The
possibility acquired by the U.S. on the world chess-board
to put in each case stakes slightly greater than that to
which an adversary would consent, constitutes the essential
and general character of deterrence. (1966)
-We are in a situation of U.S.-Soviet parity based on equiva-




GENERAL MILITARY POWER OR WAR WINNING CAPABILITY (U.S. VS. S.U.)
BALANCE PERCEPTIONS
Of 30 comparisons
9+1 s.o. favored U.S.
4 favored S.U.
16+1 s.o. indicated equality
BREAKDOWN PER FIVE-YEAR PERIOD
Number of
U.S. S.U. E,. Split Opinions Comparisons
1955-1959 1 2 2 5
1960-1964 1 4 5
1965-1969 4 4 1 (U.S. or Eq.) 9




1 957  1 b 2
1958
1959 1 1
1960 ic  1
1961




1966 1 1 2
1967 2 2
1968 1£  1 (U.S. or Eq)9  2
1969 1 1 2
1973 1 1 2 4
1971 1 1
1972 2 2
1973 1 1 1 3
1974 1 1
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Footnotes for Table A-1
(a) Qualified by saying Soviet lead diminishing.
(b) Restricted to comparing how well each country was
equipped to obtain its war objectives.
(c) Qualified by saying U.S. lead diminishing.
(d) Restricted to U.S.-S.U. arms race in general.
(e) Qualified by saying S.UT. was having a hard time keeping
up with arms development and production.
(f) Qualified by saying Soviet menace increasing.
(g) DN author indicated equality but held open possibility
U.S. may be stronger.
(h) Qualified by saying Soviets closing gap.
(i) One comparison qualified by saying S.U. may pull ahead.
(j) Qualitative comparison focusing on military technologies.
(k) DN authors, focusing on increasing S.U. military power,
stated that the world military situation was "bipolar...
with a certain tendency to lean toward Soviet superiority."
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For reasons outlined in the introductory chapter, this
writer is not highly confident that the GMP-WWC data closely
approximates DN perceptions about this balance. The problem is
not so much with the data presented below as it is with potentially
relevant but difficult-to-deal-with references not included in
the data set.
There were 3C comparisons, and, with 10 iri the first decade
and 20 .n th% second, the distribution suggests heightened interest
over time in this balance.
Balance Perceptions
The balance was most frequently seen as in equality, these
comparisons accounting for slightly over half the total. Except
for two in 1957, all equality comparisons occurred after 1961
with no year having more than two.
In superiority comparisons, the United States fared better
than the Soviet Union. The former was seen as actually ahead 9
times (especially from 1965 through 1973) and possibly so once
!in a split opinion) in contrast to 4 instances of perceived
superiority for the latter (in 1955, '59: '70, and '73). Three
comparisons favoring the Americans (in 1960, 1968, and 1970)
were qualified to suggest the balance was shifting away from them
as was one "pro-Soviet" comparison (in 1955).
Justifications
DN authors "justified" their views on equallty as follows:
-two simply said in effect that both sides had the
capability to neutralize one another (1957 and 1968).
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-one saw the efforts of each to outdo the other in the
arms race as inevitably and recurringly ending up in
an "uncertain and precarious balance." (1962)
-a fourth viewed each side as "possessling] all the
classical and modern attributes for waging war." (1963)
-a fifth implied that parity had been reached due to
the Soviets catching up with the U.S. (1972)
-a sixth stated parity was "based on equivalent (U.I. and
S.U.] arsenals of global power and diversification." (1974)
There were two justifications of "pro-American" comparisons.
One author (in 1965) was impressed enough with U.S. performance
in Exercise Polar Strike to accept it as proof of American capa-
bility to handle all military challenges whatever the environment.
A second author (in 1966) based his views on the belief that,
according to him, the United States had sufficient military
capability to "put in rach case (of confrontacion) stakes slightly
greater than that to which an adversary would consent...."
"Pro-Soviet" justifications also occurred twice. The first
(in 1955) reflected the view that the U.S. had not yet adequately
rearmed following its "foolish" and precipitous post-World War II
disarmament, and the other (in 1959) the view that Soviet forces
could better sustain a nuclear attack and have the residual left
to go on and win.
Sources of Information
The following constitute the acknowledged sources:
-the 1967 issue of Strategic Survey (1968)
-the 1968-1969 SIPRI Yearbook (1970)
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-President Nixon's report to the Congress on the
Administration's foreign policy (1971 and 1972)
-An.aual Report of the JCS Chairman (1973)
Triggering Events
The publication of each source specified above constituted
a triggering event. Additional events included:
-initiation of the Minuteman program (1959)
-Soviet announcement of a defense budget reduction (1964)
-the Polar Strike Exercise (1965)
-recent statements by high U.S. officials that the U.S.
was falling behind militarily (1968)
-ongoing SALT and MBFR negotiations (1973)
-ongoing SALT, MBFR, and CSCE negotiations (1973)
-the 25th anniversary of NATO (1974)
Recommendations
Five recommendations appeared more than once, and it seems
significant that for four of these, the same recommendation is
associated with different perceptions of the balance. This
situation suggests that the state of the balance per se may,
depending upon various conditions, not be an especially good
indicator of the foreign or defense policy recommendations of
third country observers. The five recommendations are:
-France must increase her military power, including
her force de frappe (associ. -d with four equality
comparisons, one each in 1957 and 1963 and twice in 1967).
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-The West or the U.S. must act to insure against Soviet
military superiority (associated with two favorable
U.S. comparisons, one each in 1960 and 1973 and two
equality comparisons, one each in 1962 and 1970).
-France or Europe should seek greater autonomy from the
U.S. (associated with two equality comparisons, one each
in 1957 and 1972; one "pro-U.S." comparison in 1970; and
one "pro-S.U." comparison in 1973).
-France or Europe should guard against superpower
condominium (associated with two equality comparisons--
one each in 1957 and 1972--and one favorable Soviet
comparison in 1973).
-Peaceful stability is preferable to d .perpower arms
race (associated with a favorable Soviet comparison in
1955 and an equality comparison in 1972).
Three additional recommendations appeared once each, and
all were associated with perceptions of equality:
-Nations must learn to adjust their policies to the
superpower balance. (1957)
-The most favorable situation is an inter-penetration
of the East and West alliances and an end to bipolarity.
Should the balance tilt in favor of the Soviets, Europe
must do what is necessary, including open dialogue with
the East. (1970)
-Politics and economics, not military matters, are the
main problems of today. (1973)
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The Question of Context
Table A-2 indicates 28 N/W-S/S comparisons, very close to the
number of U.S.-S.U. comparisons, suggesting the possibility of
approximately equal attention given to both. As with the U.S.-
S.U. comparisons, the number of N/W-S/S comparisons increased
gradually over time.
Of possibly greater significance is that the N/W side fared
poorly compared with the U.S. side (4 favorable N/W comparisons,
including 1 s.o., vice 9, also including 1 s.o.). While the U.S.
was particularly favored from 1965 through 1973, the N/W group
was not favored at 311 after 1965. These data suggest that DN
authors had more confidence in U.S. capabilities to face the
Soviet Union in a straight U.S.-S.U. confrontation than in the
capabilities of the N/W group to confront the Soviet bloc as a
whole or the Soviets in particular. A possible explanation may
be associated with a recurring concern of DN authors with intra-
NATO decision-making. It may be that DN authors believe that,
when the U.S. is operating alone, it may actually be more effec-
tive than in situations when it must be more directly concerned
with the interests and sensitivities of its allies.
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Table A-2
GENERAL MILITARY POWER OR WAR-WINNING CAPABILITY (N/W VS S/S)
BALANCE PERCEPTIONS
Of 28 comparisons
3+1 s.o. favored N/W
11+1 s.0. favored S/S
12+2 s.o. indicated equality
BREAKDOWN PER FIVE-YEAR PERIOD
Number of
_1W I Split Opinions Comparisons
1955-1959 2 5 1 1 (N/W or Eq) 1 (S/S or Eg) . 10
1960-1964 1 3 4
1965-1969 1 3 2 6
1970-1974 2 6 8
YEARLY BREAKDOWN
1955 1 a 2 b 3
1956 2c 2
1957 id 1 (N/W or Eq)e 2
1958 1 (S/S or Eg) 1
1959 1 1 2
1960 1







l 1 1 2
1966 1 1




1971 3 1 3
1972 1 1-
1973 1 1 2
1974 _ _ _ _
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Footnotes for Table A-2
(a) Qualified by saying that the U.S. was tiring and might
leave Europe, thereby causing a shift in favor of S/S.
(b) One comparison qualified by saying S/S lead would diminish
if NATO reforms carried out.
(c) One comparison qualified by saying N/W was increasing its
military power and might soon reach equality.
(d) Qualified by saying that N/W must exhibit strength of will
to use nuclear weapons.
(e) S/S viewed as winning if they undertook surprise attack.
N/W viewed as possibly winning if they resorted to nuclear
weapons.
(f) Situation of equality seen shiftinC in favor of S/S since
1953.
(g) Qualified by characterizing S/S lead as "temporary."
(h) Qualitative comparison only focusing on military technologies.
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APPENDIX III
US-SU MISCELLANEOUS STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS:
BALANCE PERCEPTIONS DATA
Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals
Delivery systems in 1957 US
general (without 1957 US
specifying partic- 1960 Equal 4 comparisons
ular systems) 1969 US Quantitative. Qualified 3 favored US
by saying Soviet augmen- 1 indicated
tation of ICBMs was forcin equality
US to react.
Satellite as 1 comparison
delivery systems 1957 SU SU favored
Naval Systems in 1960 US 1 comparison








Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals
1962 US
1962 SU
1963 US US viewed as "maybe" ahead 7 comparisons
2 favored US
1968 Eq
3 + 1 so
1969 SU favored SU
1970 SU or Eq Author ambiguous 1 + I so
indicated
1973 SU In that Soviets have an equality
operational system
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MISCELLANEOUS CONVENTIONAL OR GROUND FORCES:
SUB-BALANCES PERCEPTIONS DATA
US-SU COMPARISONS
Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals
Personnel numbers 1957 SU





"Intervention 1972 US 1 comparison
forces" US favored
Artillery 1973 SU Quantitative 1 comparison
SU favored
Tanks 1972 Su Quantitative 2 comparisons
both favored




Area Year Favoring Renarks Totals





















Tanks 1968 S/S Quantitative/European
theater only.
1969 S/S + N/W S/S quantitative and N/W
qualitative. N/W also has
more ATWs (anti-tank
weapons).





Area YearlPvr~l Remarks Totals
Tanks (continued) 19T721 I s/s Quantitative only. 141W 6 comparisons
also has "marked superi- 0 + 2 s.o.
ority" in ATWs and combat favored 14/W
helicopters.
4 + 2 s.o.
favored S/S
S/S Quantitative only. 14/W
bas a "certain advantag "
in ATWs.
1974 S/5 Quantitative only
Anti-Tank Weapons 1969 14/W Quantitatire only 3 comparisons
all favo':ed
1972 14/W 14/W







Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals
Major surface 1972 US Quantitative 2 comparisons
ships-in-general both favored
1973 US Quantitative but SU US
clcsing gap














- Cruisers 1962 US Quantitative
- Missile 1968 us
cruisers 1
- Gun cruisers 1968 SU
1972 "I
- Frigates 1962 SU
- Destroyers 1962 us
- Missile 1972 us
frigates and
destroyers
- Gun destroyer 1969 US
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APPENDIX VI (continued)
Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals
- Destroyers and 1972 Us Quantitative
destroyer
escorts
- Missile 1968 Us 20 comparisons
destroyers and 13 favored US
destroyer 7 favored SU
escorts
- Escorts 1968 US
- Minesweepers 1962 SU
- Patrol craft 1962 SU
1972 SU
- Amphibious 1962 US
ships
- Auxiliaries 1962 us
- Surface-to-air 1969 US
missile ships
- Surface-to- 1969 US
surface missile
ships







1962 SU 15 comparisons
1 + 1 so
Eq Technical/qualitative only favored US
13 + 1 so







Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals
1968 SU
US Technical/qualizative only
1970 SU Quantitative only





- Non-ballistic 1972 SU Quantitative
missile
- Nuclear-powered 1973 US Quantitative but SU closin
boats gap
- Nuclear-powered 1968 US Quantitative
missile boats
- Deisel-powered 1968 SU 11 comparisons
mnissile boats 5 favored US
- Cruise missile 1969 SU 6 favored SU
boats
- Attack boats 1972 SU




- Deisel-powered 1969 SU
attack boats




Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals
Construction
- "of new naval 1959 US 3 comparisons
arms" 1 favored US
- rate of surfacc 1960 SU 2 favored SU
ships minus
carriers









1963 uS 2 indicated
equality
1972 US Relative to surface ships
only
- Submarine 1962 Eq
- Naval air 1962 Eq
- Naval surface-
to-air missiles 1956 US
- Advanced 1956 us
design
Surface-to- surface 1968 SU Though US aircraft may 2 comparisons
missiles compensate both favored
1970 SU SU
Equipping of Naval 1964 US 1 comparison
Forces US favored
Logistics capa- 1962 US 4 comparisons





Ares Year Favoring Remarks Totals
Amphibious capa- 1962 US 2 comparisons
bility US favored
1968 US
Training 1964 US 1 comparison
US favored
Surface ship con- 1958 Us 2 comparisons
frontation at sea US favored
1960 US





Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals




- Missile 1969 N/W Quantitative 2 comparisons
destroyers Both favored
N/W




- Attack boats 1972 S/S
- Nucleaz- 1969 N/W 4 comparisons
powered 1 favored N/W
attack boats 3 favored S/S
- Deisel- 1969 S/S
powered boats 1972 S/S
Anti-submarine
warfare units 1972 N/W 1 comparisonN/W favored
REGTONAL NAVAL BALANCES
(BOTH US vs SU and N/W vs S/S)
Area Year Favorin, Remarks Totals
Mediterranean 1968 US Though SU now second 4 comparisons
2 favored US




1971 N/W Though less in favor
of West than it used
to be




Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals
Baltic 1956 SU Quantitative
1962 SU 5 comparisons
3 favored S/U
1968 SU 2 favored S/S
1972 S/S
1972 S/S
Indian ocean 1965 us 1 comparison
US favored











- Medium and 1965 US Quantitative
light
- Medium, light, 1966 SU
and fighter 6 comparisons
1 favored US




Fighters/Tactical 1957 Eq With US ahead qualitatively
air and in all-weather fighters
and SU ahead quantitatively
1957 US Heavy fighters only 6 comparisons
3 + I s.o.
1972 SU favored US
1 + 1 s.o.
US Quantitative favored SU
1 indicated
US equality
1973 US + SU US ahead qualitatively
(though gap closing in
ground suppo :t aircraft)
and SU quantitatively in
interceptors










Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals
- Aerodynamics 1957 Eq 4 comparisons
2 favored US
- 1ot3rs 1957 SU 1 favored SU
, ,.1 equality
Production rate of 1957 SU 1 comparison
Aircraft SU favored
Personnel & Pilots 1957 Equal Though US may be ahead in 2 comparisons









Area Year Favoring Remarks Totals
Tactical/Fighter 1964 S/S Quantitative
Air Balanqe in
Europe




N/W + S/S N/W qualitative and S/S
quantitative
1970 N/W + S/S Ditto previous 8 comparisons
0 + 4 s.o.
N/W + S/S Ditto previous favored N/W
S4+4 s.o.
favored S/S
1972 S/S Quantitative but NATO has
strong air defense
S/S Quantitative
1974 S/S (Central Europe)
Personnel 1968 N/W Quantitative 1 comparison
N/W favored
Training 1969 N/W 1 comparison
N/W favored
